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Evacuation and Return: Increasing Safety and Reducing Risk 
An Outreach Strategy 
Introduction 
The City of New Orleans enlisted UNO-CHART to improve the evacuation of the 
vulnerable populations in the city, defined broadly to include those who are not able to 
access or use the standard resources offered in disaster preparedness and planning, 
response, and recovery. To do this, UNO-CHART analyzed the Regional Transit 
Authority (RTA), the City Assisted Evacuation Plan (CAEP) and Special Needs Registry 
databases, conducted a literature review of risk communication best practices, reviewed 
ready.nola.gov for content and readability, conducted a social vulnerability analysis of 
the Evacuspots, conducted interviews and focus groups with vulnerable populations in 
the City of New Orleans, and evaluated the CAEP full scale exercise.  
UNO-CHART conducted these analyses in order to examine the transportation needs of 
vulnerable populations on an everyday basis and during a disaster event, and how the 
city’s services currently meets those needs. The project team discovered that while 
many members of vulnerable populations use public transportation on a daily basis, 
there are issues with obtaining transportation during a disaster. The issues stem from a 
lack of resident knowledge about the City Assisted Evacuation (CAE) process, locations 
of Evacuspots, accessibility and cultural competence of the CAE, and trust in the city to 
effectively bring vulnerable populations to safety. Residents detailed many different ways 
the city can build on the past to create community solutions. The following report details 
recommendations for how to make residents more aware of the CAEP, make 
Evacuspots more accessible, better plan for the city’s most vulnerable, integrate cultural 
competence into the CAEP, and build trust in self-reliant populations. 
Data, Methods, and Analysis 
The UNO-CHART project team created recommendations based on an analysis of the 
databases that the city uses for the CAEP, a literature review of risk communication 
literature and best practices, a mapping analysis of vulnerable populations and the 
Evacuspots, an evaluation of the full scale exercise, and conducting interviews and 
focus groups with vulnerable populations. The following section describes the methods 
used in each analysis in greater detail. 
Database Analysis 
The project team examined the utility of three databases that are related to City Assisted 
Evacuation. The databases included the CAEP database, the public health database, 
also known as the Special Needs Registry, and the RTA’s database. The team gathered 
information on the databases from the New Orleans Office of Homeland Security & 
Emergency Preparedness (NOHSEP), the New Orleans Health Department, and the 
RTA. The team then used this information to make recommendations on how to improve 
each database. 
Literature Review 
The project team conducted a literature review of best practices in risk communication. 
The literature review analyzes the frequently utilized risk communication strategies and 
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best practices for informing and assisting vulnerable populations throughout all stages of 
an emergency. The review also provides insight on the existing evaluation methods to 
gauge the effectiveness of risk communication programs and their capacity to inform 
vulnerable communities. 
Community Mapping of Vulnerable Populations Near Evacuspots 
The research team used the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) adapted to the causal 
model used by Clark et al. to analyze the Evacuspot locations relative to vulnerable 
populations [1; 3]. Demographic data provided by the American Community Survey 
served as the primary source for the study, enabling the construction of a social 
vulnerability index for the City of New Orleans. 
The accessibility and availability of the 2014 American Community Survey in Orleans 
Parish allowed the research team to use a similar format for data collection [4]. The team 
used nine distinct variables for the SoVI, including disabled population, population 
without vehicles, population 60 years and older, minority population, population who 
earn less than $25,000 per year, population in poverty, population with less than a high 
school diploma, single parent households, and population who speak a language other 
than English. The team then categorized the variables using a three-tier system, which 
placed a greater emphasis on the variables that impact evacuation. The team used 
these components to determine a single numerical value that reflects the social 
vulnerability of a given census tract. 
The team then mapped the Evacuspots and census tracts to determine the location of 
the Evacuspots relative to the vulnerable populations in the city. The team further 
mapped the location of members of the Special Needs Registry, as well as nursing 
home and senior living facilities, to compare to the SoVI map in order to determine the 
accuracy of the mapping methodology. 
Exercise Evaluation 
UNO-CHART distributed evaluations to residents who participated in the city’s full scale 
exercise of the CAE. A total of 126, or 25%, of the 496 exercise participants completed 
the survey. The evaluations included 12 questions about the respondent’s role in the 
exercise, their future use of the CAE, what they learned from the exercise, and what they 
thought could be changed or improved. The project team used the responses from the 
evaluations to make recommendations for the CAEP process. 
Interviews and Focus Groups 
The project team also conducted semi-structured interviews and focus groups [2]. The 
interviews involved both face to face and over the phone discussions with individuals, 
while the focus groups included face-to-face discussions with 6 to 8 participants [2]. Both 
UNO-CHART and Evacuteer conducted the interviews, while UNO-CHART conducted 
the focus groups.  
Evacuteer conducted interviews with 9 members of the general public, and the UNO-
CHART team conducted interviews with 5 members of the Special Needs Registry. The 
interviewers asked the participants questions regarding their experience with the RTA, 
the CAEP, and the Special Needs Registry, as appropriate.  
UNO-CHART also conducted three focus groups with members of local nonprofits that 
work with vulnerable populations throughout the city. Focus groups are an effective 
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method for gathering data, as they give the investigator control over the questions and 
answers, while allowing them to observe the participants [2]. Through focus groups, 
participants can provide information about their lives, their community, and their history, 
and share ideas with other members of the focus group. This allows for a more robust 
answer to the questions, as it is a group response. Similar to the interviews, the focus 
group conversations focused on the RTA, the CAEP, and the Special Needs Registry, 
but also provided time for the participants to comment on the portion of the city’s website 
dedicated to the CAE. Additionally, the focus groups allowed the participants to voice 
their concerns on general issues related to transportation. 
 
The team noted and transcribed the data from the interviews and focus groups. The 
team then coded the transcriptions using inductive and deductive categories. The 
interviews and focus groups were coded using Dedoose software, which aids 
researchers in using systematic methods to code text. It also provides analytical tables 
and charts, such as code clouds and tables of the number of codes by interview subject. 
These analytical tools help to synthesize the data when coming to conclusions about the 
findings. The UNO-CHART team analyzed the data by identifying common codes from 
the individual interviews and focus groups, and then creating themes from those codes.  
 
The project team then used the analyses to create themes. These themes include 
positive experiences with RTA and the CAEP; making residents aware of the CAEP; 
location, spacing, and logistics of Evacuspots; planning for the city’s most vulnerable, 
integrating cultural competence into the CAEP, building trust in a self-reliant population, 
and building on the past to create community solutions. The next section provides details 
for each theme and includes a list of related recommendations.  The team utilized the 
CAEP database analysis, literature review, mapping analysis, interviews and focus 
groups, and exercise evaluation to make the following recommendations. 
 
 
Positive Experiences with RTA and the Evacuation Plan 
 
The study underlined the importance of public transportation in the city, as well as the 
City Assisted Evacuation process, and brought to light the number and variety of people 
who will rely on it. The recommendations focused on the ways transportation services 
help vulnerable populations, and the participants’ appreciation of transportation, as well 
as the City Assisted Evacuation process. Residents stated that City Assisted Evacuation 
is an essential service. Many respondents also said that they appreciated the city’s 
services prior to and during evacuation. Other participants discussed the importance of 
RTA, RTA’s Lift service, and the importance of public emergency services in their lives.  
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The quotes and recommendations below reflect residents’ experience with public 
transportation in the city. 
 
 
Recommendations: 
• Continue the RTA Lift Service. 
• Continue the Special Needs Registry. 
• Continue the City Assisted Evacuation Plan. 
 
 
Making Residents Aware of the City Assisted Evacuation Plan 
 
Although residents highlighted the positives of the CAEP, many participants stated that 
they had not heard of Evacuspots and/or the City Assisted Evacuation process. Many 
residents who use the RTA’s Paratransit service assume they do not need to register for 
the CAEP as “the city knows where I am.” These residents should also be included in 
the Special Needs Registry, and the RTA drivers could assist in their registration. Some 
residents stated that they have seen the statues around the city, but do not know their 
significance. In addition, respondents had ideas about potential outreach strategies to 
share information about the process with residents: 
 
• Place fliers in mailboxes, at bus stops, in churches and at grocery stores 
• Compose the fliers or information in plain language, so that everyone can 
comprehend the meaning 
• Advertise the evacuation plan on the radio and television 
• Reach out to local churches and community groups 
• Design outreach efforts to be accessible to blind, print impaired, deaf, elderly, 
and non-English speaking populations 
• Implement a risk communication program that includes messages catered to 
appropriate audiences, with informative messages disseminated by a trusted 
individual 
I use RTA. They even put up a bus stop after Katrina. I told them I walked with a 
cane and they put a bus stop near my house. If you speak up, people help. I love 
RTA. They lower the bus and they raise it back up and I love it! Bus drivers are 
nice and very calm. They had gotten to know my name. 
I use the bus and walk. I’ve been doing that for a long-time, it’s 
just what I do, and everything goes smoothly. 
I went through Katrina as a 12-year-old. I'm now 24 and it’s nice to 
see that the city has taken action for an evacuation plan.       
Thank you!  
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The quotes and recommendations indicate ways to make residents more aware of the 
CAEP. 
 
 
 
Recommendations:  
 
• Ensure that residents who use RTA’s Paratransit service are also registered for 
the Special Needs Registry. 
• Add signage at all Evacuspots explaining the significance of the spots. 
• Conduct outreach efforts using multiple mediums in a variety of places around 
the community. 
• Design all outreach materials to be in plain language, and accessible to 
populations with disabilities. 
 
 
Location, Spacing, and Logistics of Evacuspots 
 
There are some logistical issues with the Evacuspots. Mainly, the Evacuspots are not 
optimally located. Multiple Evacuspots are located in areas with a marginal amount of 
vulnerable populations, while other areas with high degrees of social vulnerability have 
minimal or no Evacuspots. For example, there are large distances between vulnerable 
populations and Evacuspots in Gentilly, New Orleans East, Hollygrove, and Algiers. On 
the other hand, there are multiple Evacuspots in areas with low social vulnerability, such 
as Uptown and Lakeview.  
 
Whenever a disaster strikes, 
whether it be hurricanes or oil 
spills, they go to the church first 
for information. 
I know it’s being done via public 
television, newspaper, and the 
media, but not everybody gets it. 
Not everybody reads. 
The city should be more 
responsible for getting the 
information out about the 
Evacuspots. I think a lot of people 
still don’t know that the statues 
are there for those without 
transportation. 
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The team mapped social vulnerability using the devised social vulnerability index, as well 
as the Special Needs Registry. The Special Needs Registry, nursing home, and senior 
living facilities’ data echo the social vulnerability in Algiers, Central City, Treme, the 7th 
Ward, Gentilly, and New Orleans East. However, all of these areas are a great distance 
from an Evacuspot. Therefore, the number and location of Evacuspots do not 
necessarily reflect the needs of vulnerable populations in the city.  
 
According to WalkScore, the ideal distance for a pedestrian to reach a destination in an 
urban area is a quarter of a mile. However, there are census tracts with high levels of 
social vulnerability, such as the 7th Ward, St. Roch, and lower Algiers, that are not even 
within a mile range of an Evacuspot. The interviewees agreed that the Evacuspots are 
too far away to reach on foot, particularly in the 7th, 8th, and 9th wards and New Orleans 
East. Also, many Evacuspots are not accessible to people with disabilities.  
 
The maps below illustrate the distance between Evacuspots and areas of high social 
vulnerability. The first map shows social vulnerability according to census data, while the 
second map shows social vulnerability using the Special Needs Registry and senior 
centers. In both maps, high social vulnerability is shown in red, moderate social 
vulnerability in orange, and low social vulnerability in green. 
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The quotes and recommendations below underline the logistical issues with 
Evacuspots across the city. 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
• Continue to analyze Evacuspots locations using the Social Vulnerability Index so 
that the spots reflect the needs of the vulnerable populations in the city. 
• Redesign Evacuspots to be more accessible for residents of the 7th, 8th, and 9th 
wards, as well as New Orleans East, through additional Evacuspots and/or a 
shuttle service. 
• Improve the accessibility of Evacuspots for residents with disabilities. 
• Relocate Evacuspots, if necessary, to improve walking distances for evacuees. 
 
 
Planning for the City’s Most Vulnerable 
 
The city’s vulnerable populations have needs in both everyday and disaster events. 
There is a marked lack of cooperation/coordination between the city and the RTA on a 
routine basis. The respondents expressed frustration with the non-disaster, everyday 
RTA and paratransit services. As the interviewees considered their experiences during 
Katrina and Gustav, the problems with transportation in the city became even more 
apparent. Many participants had problems at the shelters in previous evacuations. The 
respondents pointed out the need for shelters designed for specific disabilities, and they 
stated that the bathrooms at the shelters were not equipped to serve the special needs 
community. Some interviewees also disclosed that the uncertainty about where they 
would go in the event of an evacuation, as well as distrust of the city's plan, could 
prevent many of the city’s most vulnerable from leaving a dangerous situation. Other 
participants revealed that the name of the Special Needs Registry might deter residents 
from signing up, or understanding that they should sign up for the registry before an 
event occurs. Still others emphasized the need for confidentiality when discussing health 
issues during the evacuation process, and difficulties with the term special needs. Full-
I haven’t seen all the spots; it seems to me that those were not for the size of the 
community. The distance from where our residents live to where there is an 
Evacuspot is a problem.  
The evacuation spots, I think they should be more centrally 
located; they need to have more. 
Only one pick-up point in the East. ONE. 
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scale exercise participants remarked that the special needs population was separated 
from their families and should not have to wait with the general population at the UPT. 
Participants further pointed out that Evacuspot volunteers were not prepared to deal with 
some health issues, and private medical conditions should not be made public during the 
registration process. 
 
The quotes and recommendations below reveal suggestions for planning for the 
most vulnerable. 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
• Improve the speed of Paratransit applications and enlist RTA drivers to help 
register residents for the Special Needs Registry. 
• Train Paratransit drivers on methods to adequately care for vulnerable 
populations. 
• Include sign language during live streaming events. 
• Improve accessibility of RTA services for people with disabilities. 
• Improve shelters for people with disabilities. 
• Consider an alternative term for “special needs.” 
• Maintain confidentiality of health information during evacuation. 
 
 
People with disabilities hate the term 
special needs and will not connect 
themselves with that Special Needs 
Registry because they don't think 
they are “special needs.” If you use 
the term disability some elderly 
people will not connect.  
Can you imagine getting on a bus 
when you’re not seeing? You can’t 
trust the city to take care of you. 
People won’t leave, because at least 
you know you’re home. You don’t 
know what’s going to happen to us in 
a shelter. 
You don’t want people standing at an 
Evacuspot asking people what’s their 
health issue. That’s also important for 
mental health. 
	 10	
 
 
Integrating Cultural Competence into the CAEP 
 
There are issues reaching populations who speak languages other than English in the 
city. Many respondents in the Vietnamese and Latino communities stated that there was 
not enough information about the CAEP in other languages. Members of the Vietnamese 
and Latino communities also said that there should be more translators involved in the 
evacuation, in order to explain the logistics of the evacuation to the evacuees. 
Additionally, members of the Vietnamese community in New Orleans East pointed out 
that transportation to Evacuspots could be difficult, as there are very few bus lines in 
their area. Furthermore, participants explained that the undocumented community is 
hesitant to go to the UPT, as they think they will be detained or harassed by immigration 
officials. The interviewees also explained that there are many day laborers that act as 
first responders and rebuilders, and do not plan to evacuate the city, preferring to stay 
behind and work. 
 
The quotes and recommendations below emphasize ways to integrate cultural 
competence into the CAEP. 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
• Provide outreach materials in multiple languages. 
• Involve more translators in the evacuation process. 
• Involve more translators in the sheltering process. 
 
 
Building Trust in a Self-Reliant Population  
 
Residents’ distrust in the city and the CAE process often cause them to rely on their own 
resources during a disaster. Some elderly residents feel attached to their homes and 
The biggest problem we have, is that services are not readily available for those 
who do not speak English. Where the routes are, where they can find 
information, and getting out of the city are issues.  
We serve such a broad community, really poor people, who don’t 
have access to this information. We also serve English-limited 
communities. It’s all in English.  
During Katrina, once they go to a shelter, they don’t have 
language assistance or the food, so it’s not culturally sensitive. 
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neighborhoods, and do not want to leave. Due to previous disasters, residents that 
recently relocated to stable housing are less likely to leave, as they are afraid they will 
not be able to come back. Many residents stated that there is distrust or uncertainty 
surrounding the transportation of pets and service animals. Residents worried that the 
city did not know the difference between service animals and pets, and expressed the 
need to bring their service animal to the shelters with them. Additionally, advocates for 
immigrant and Latino communities repeatedly brought up concerns about evacuating 
people without documents, as there were difficulties with documents in shelters in the 
past. Today, undocumented immigrants also face increased state and federal scrutiny, 
and community members say that many will not evacuate if there are no sanctuary 
shelters free from ICE inspection. Still, according to the evaluations the CAE exercise 
participants filled out, 39.1% will really on the CAE during an event. However, 37.9% of 
those participants said that the city is not prepared for future evacuations. Building trust 
in these populations may even increase CAE reliance. 
 
The quotes and recommendations below suggest ways to build trust in the city. 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
• Explain to residents that the city will help them to evacuate and to return to their 
homes. 
• Be transparent about the evacuation process. 
• Underline the availability of shelters for pets, and explain the city’s policies on 
service animals. 
• Be mindful of the plight of undocumented residents during evacuation and 
sheltering. 
The trust part is probably the 
biggest part. It’s hard to get them 
to leave everything. Trust us is 
the first big thing. We need 
someone from our community to 
follow them all the way to          
the shelter. 
Unless you make them leave they 
won’t leave. They won’t leave 
without a place to go definitely. 
They have a hard time coming 
back. They don’t want to leave 
their home anymore.  
Here’s the big issue: people want 
to know where they’re going 
when they get on the bus. If they 
can know where they’re going 
that’d be a huge help. 
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Building on the Past to Create Community Solutions 
 
There are multiple ways to streamline and improve the evacuation process for 
vulnerable populations.  
 
• Involve local residents and organizations that work with vulnerable populations in 
the outreach process 
• Use these groups to test outreach materials, provide feedback, and report how 
their members utilize the materials 
 
There are also ways to make the information gathering process more efficient. Since 
there is a disparate range of information and maintenance on the three databases used 
in the CAEP, the city could consolidate the databases in order to make the data 
collection process more efficient and effective.  
 
Residents who experienced previous evacuations also had suggestions for 
improvement. One participant said a database for picking up people was a good idea, 
but that there should also be neighborhood captains that reach out to individuals on the 
Special Needs Registry in person, just in case their contact information changes. 
Respondents also mentioned that there should be counselors on site at UPT, and that 
the city should strive to create a space that evokes calm. Additionally, interviewees 
suggested moving vulnerable populations, such as the elderly, separately, and 
communicating the destination to all evacuees.  
 
Some recommendations addressed mechanical issues. A participant mentioned that a 
bus had a flat tire during the full-scale exercise, and it took some time to find a 
mechanic. This participant suggested keeping mechanics on call during an actual event. 
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The quotes and recommendations below reveal ways to create community 
solutions for the CAEP. 
 
 
Recommendations: 
 
• Identify common information for the CAEP, Special Needs and RTA 
databases in order to develop one centralized database. 
• Enlist neighborhood captains to help reach out to vulnerable populations. 
• Install counselors at the UPT and at shelters to help keep evacuees calm. 
• Consider moving vulnerable populations to shelters separately. 
• Keep mechanics on call to help with any vehicle issues. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Accessing transportation on an everyday basis can be a stressful experience for 
vulnerable populations. Evacuating during a disaster can be even more so. Additionally, 
reaching vulnerable populations requires innovative and collaborative strategies. The 
City of New Orleans can use the above recommendations to make residents more 
aware of the CAEP, make Evacuspots more accessible, better plan for the city’s most 
vulnerable, integrate cultural competence into the CAEP, and build trust in self-reliant 
populations. Through the implementation of these recommendations, the city will help 
improve the day-to-day transportation experience, as well as the evacuation, of the 
vulnerable populations in the city.  
 
  
A database is a great idea but what if people changed their phone number? What 
about a neighborhood captain? We should have something in place for people 
that is more than a database—a person. 
We need to segment groups, why put them all in one place? Let 
the elderly go with the elderly. Just take elderly 
residents wherever they’re going to go, together. 
I think we should say somewhere that this can make people 
anxious and can produce anxiety.  
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Introduction 
 
After Hurricane Katrina, the City of New Orleans sought to address the existing gaps in 
emergency preparedness experienced by vulnerable populations, in order to reduce the 
potential for harm in the face of another natural disaster. The city created the City Assisted 
Evacuation Plan to provide assistance to individuals who “lack the capability to self-evacuate” 
due to a lack of means or “physical limitations” (Mayor’s Brief on City Assisted Evacuation Plan, 
2006). The city developed the plan for implementation under the threat of a Category 3 or above 
hurricane (Evacuteers.org). In conjunction with the city, the nonprofit Evacuteer established 17 
evacuation pick-up points throughout New Orleans that are marked by 14-foot metal sculptures. 
These locations, known as Evacuspots, utilize existing bus stops and five senior center 
locations to create an official meeting place where individuals can be picked up by buses and 
processed to shelters outside of the city during a mandatory evacuation. This analysis seeks to 
identify potential vulnerable populations that exist in proximity to the Evacuspots.  
 
For the purpose of this analysis, vulnerability is defined as “susceptibility of social groups to the 
impacts of hazards, as well as their resiliency or ability to adequately recover from them” 
(Cutter, 2006). Communities who face certain socioeconomic disadvantages are prone to a 
higher level of vulnerability and risk (Morrow, 2009). For example, a household living below the 
poverty line may not be able to purchase the necessary supplies or find suitable transportation 
to evacuate prior to an anticipated disaster. Other factors such as age, culture, health, 
education, and family dynamics make households more susceptible to disasters. The existing 
literature supports the evidence that the poor are more vulnerable throughout all stages of an 
emergency, with findings that also suggest that “racial and ethnic minorities, children, elders, or 
disabled people” are similarly affected (Flanagan et al., 2011).  
 
Additionally, social, economic and political forces can often compound the vulnerability of 
populations they are designed to help (Morrow, 1999). Therefore, effective emergency planning 
includes an understanding of existing vulnerabilities, and the subsequent tailoring of policies to 
those needs. Government agencies at the local level have the greatest capacity to identify 
vulnerable communities, enabling them to “effectively target and support community-based 
efforts” in preparation for disaster (Flanagan et al., 2011). Understanding the nature of 
vulnerable populations and their location gives local government authorities the ability to 
“efficiently evacuate those who might need transportation or special assistance” (Flanagan et 
al., 2011). Emergency departments rely on up-to-date information on vulnerability present in 
their communities, and use this information to effectively deploy assistance and resources 
during every phase of a disaster. Mapping community vulnerability provides extensive data 
about where socially vulnerable populations reside (Cutter, 2006).  
 
Literature Review 
 
There are numerous social indicators that reflect increased vulnerability to hazards. When 
exploring vulnerability, it is helpful to consider the most significant relationships that exist 
between socioeconomic variables and increased hazard risk (Morrow, 1999).  Morrow states 
that a “precursor to effective disaster response” is an in-depth “understanding of these patterns 
within a particular community” (1999). Disasters disproportionately affect vulnerable 
populations, emphasizing the necessity of community vulnerability mapping initiatives. Morrow 
advocates for the development of a community vulnerability inventory, encouraging 
communities to maintain active registries of disabled individuals to understand where “highly 
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vulnerable groups are represented in each neighborhood” (Morrow, 1999, p.10). The community 
vulnerability inventory reflects where certain vulnerable groups live, ranging from the elderly to 
immigrant communities. Assessing a wide range of vulnerability indicators allows planners to 
effectively “develop and prioritize strategies to reduce vulnerability” (Rygel, Sullivan, & Yarnel, 
2005, p.741). 
 
Cutter emphasizes the need to understand where vulnerable populations live, so that they can 
get the assistance they need before and after a disaster (2006). While geographic vulnerability 
can be easily identified with a record of past incidents, social vulnerability proves to be a much 
more complex issue because of “temporal and spatial variability” (2006, p. 106). In order to 
remedy this discrepancy, Cutter (2006) created a social vulnerability metric to further 
understand variations in social vulnerability between counties. Cutter’s Social Vulnerability Index 
considers the multiple “socioeconomic, demographic, and built environment variables” to 
adequately capture all of the factors that contribute to vulnerability (2006, p.106). The results of 
extensive research across counties found that only minimal variations existed in the factors that 
contribute to social vulnerability. The factors most prevalent in determining variations in 
vulnerability were: “socioeconomic status, development density, population age, race/ethnicity 
and gender” (2006, p.107).  
 
The Social Vulnerability Index provides the “operational protocol for empirically determining 
social vulnerability” (2006, p. 112). In other words, it provides researchers with the objective 
format necessary to understand the numerous factors at play when examining social 
vulnerability. It allows researchers to form a holistic image about social vulnerability in a given 
area, while simultaneously permitting insight into the role of certain factors in determining 
vulnerability. This tool gives emergency planners the ability to focus in on what factors 
contribute to vulnerability, and use these factors to make appropriate decisions throughout 
every phase of a disaster. Cutter created the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) to allow planners 
to tailor their policies to their respective communities. 
 
Communities can make use of a variety of indicators when developing a community vulnerability 
index. Rygel et al. used “poverty, gender, race and ethnicity, age and disabilities” in their social 
vulnerability study (2006, p.748). They chose these characteristics because of their ability to 
compound vulnerability. Individuals living in poverty are disproportionately affected by disasters, 
because they often lack the necessary financial capital to take precautionary measures 
throughout each phase of the disaster (2006, p.748). Women tend to face a higher degree of 
vulnerability, particularly single and divorced women, as they tend to be in lower income 
brackets (2006, p.748). Similarly, minorities are more vulnerable because they are more likely to 
live below the poverty line, as well as experience discriminatory housing practices (2006, 
p.748). Minorities are also affected by language barriers, which may prevent dissemination of 
information to their communities, as well as communication problems after a disaster (2006, 
p.748). Age plays a significant role in vulnerability, with both very young and very old 
populations more vulnerable to disaster. Children are more prone to the physical and 
psychological effects brought on by disaster, while the elderly may lack the “necessary physical 
and economic resources to respond effectively to a disaster” (2006, p.749). Those who are 
mentally or physically disabled may require assistance prior to, during, and after a disaster 
(2006, p.749). Numerous disaster management studies conclude that age, income, disability, 
and race are predominant contributors to community vulnerability, and are often used in the 
development of social vulnerability indices. 
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However, methods for selecting social vulnerability indicators and developing indices vary 
significantly depending on the purpose and context of the research. Cutter (2000) found that 
age was the primary determinant of vulnerability to hazards. Therefore, age was assigned 
“higher index values” to reflect a “higher degree of vulnerability” (Rygel et al., 2006, p. 749). On 
the other hand, an analysis by Clark et al. (1998) used five characteristics, including “people 
living below the poverty line, low capita incomes, racial minorities, [and] single mother 
households” (2006, p. 749). Within the literature, there are limited guidelines on what indicators 
researchers should utilize in vulnerability assessments, since many of the characteristics 
“correlate highly” (2006, p.749). The weight assigned to each factor varies throughout the 
literature, with no specific methodology identified as the standard. Rygel et al. suggest 
researchers develop vulnerability indicators with specific regard to place, as vulnerability is 
reflective of the risk and social factors in particular locations (2006, p.762). 
 
Cutter et al. (2000) developed a social vulnerability index specific to place in the case study of 
Georgetown, which provides an in-depth assessment of the role of risk and social vulnerability. 
In the study, the researchers analyzed and cataloged locations by the rate of occurrence of 
particular hazard events, in order to identify areas facing “environmental threats” in the county 
(2000, p.721). Additionally, the researchers defined social vulnerability by its causes, such as 
“lack of resources, including information and knowledge, limited access to political power, 
certain beliefs and customs, weak buildings, weak individuals, and infrastructure and lifelines” 
(2000, p.729).  
 
The researchers used Geographic Information Systems (GIS) to highlight the level of 
environmental threat and social vulnerability experienced throughout different areas of the 
county, as GIS grants researchers the ability to understand the spatial relations of hazards and 
vulnerability. The study combined “biophysical and social vulnerabilities,” and found that areas 
with high hazard vulnerability were not necessarily areas with the “most vulnerable populations” 
(2000, p. 733). The study further found that individuals in high-risk areas had greater access to 
resources and capital; therefore, they would be more likely to prepare and recover from a 
disaster. However, those in medium-risk areas would only require a “moderate hazard” to be 
significantly afflicted by a disaster (2000, p.733). The research conducted by Cutter et al. 
emphasized the necessity of identifying hazard and social vulnerability within a community, as it 
stresses the “relative importance of the social aspect of hazards” (2000, p.733). The utility of 
GIS in the development of a social vulnerability index aids in pinpointing the location of 
vulnerable populations, and helps researchers to better understand the needs associated with 
that vulnerability.  
 
Project Description 
 
The University of New Orleans’ Center for Hazards Assessment, Response and Technology 
(UNO-CHART) utilized GIS to develop an accurate representation of community vulnerability in 
Orleans Parish. The City Assisted Evacuation Plan uses pick-up points throughout the city to 
pick up individuals who need help evacuating, and transporting them to the Union Passenger 
Terminal for processing. This assessment evaluates the social vulnerability in the census tracts 
of the city in relation to the Evacuspot locations, by linking spatial analysis with socioeconomic 
data. The underlying research questions the project team sought to answer are: 
 
• Where are vulnerable populations throughout Orleans Parish?  
o Where are these communities relative to the Evacuspot locations? 
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• Do the Evacuspot locations adequately serve vulnerable populations?  
o Are there any gaps in the populations served?  
o Are there any redundancies with the existing Evacuspots?  
o Are there any Evacuspots in places that may not need them?  
 
Research Methodology & Design 
 
There are a multitude of potential methods used to effectively map community vulnerability. 
Deciding which design is preferable for a project requires the consideration of geographic 
location, risk, relative social vulnerability, and availability of resources. Given the dynamics of 
these factors within the City of New Orleans, the project team used the Social Vulnerability 
Index (SoVI) established by the University of South Carolina adapted to the causal model used 
by Clark et al. (1998). The project team used demographic data provided by the American 
Community Survey to construct a social vulnerability index for the City of New Orleans 
(Appendix A; U.S. Census Bureau, 2015).  
 
Cutter et al. (2006) suggest that some factors are more significant in determining overall social 
vulnerability. According to Cutter et al., social vulnerability varies due to “socioeconomic status, 
development density, population age, race/ethnicity and gender” (2006, p. 107). Therefore, the 
project team’s SoVI method utilized nine distinct variables reflective of social vulnerability within 
New Orleans, as it relates to evacuation needs. The team chose the following indicators: 
 
1. Disabled population (Disabled) 
2. Population without vehicles (No Vehicles) 
3. Population 60 years old and older (60+) 
4. Minority population (Minority) 
5. Population who earn less than $25,000 per year (Earn <25k/year) 
6. Population in poverty (Poverty) 
7. Population with less than a high school diploma (<HS) 
8. Single parent households (Single Parent HHs) 
9. Population who speak a language other than English (Other than English) 
 
An individual may fall into more than one of these categories, compounding their vulnerability to 
disasters.  
 
After deriving the variables from the American Community Survey (2014), the team conducted a 
principle component analysis. The team assigned components to a three-tier system, which 
classified the variables by weight, placing a greater emphasis on the variables that make it 
difficult for populations to evacuate. The project team ranked each set of components on a scale 
from one to three, using a multiplier to dictate the degree of priority. The team then added up 
the components to determine a single numerical value that reflects the social vulnerability of a 
given census tract. 
 
 
 
Data Collection 
 
The team used US Census data and GIS to conduct the assessment. To initiate this analysis, 
the team uploaded an updated base map of Orleans Parish into GIS. The team then requested 
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the coordinates of the Evacuspots from the Public Health Department, which were subsequently 
added to the base map (Figure 1).  
Figure 3 - Evacuspot Locations 
The team then developed quarter-mile, half-mile, and mile radius buffers surrounding each 
location. WalkScore, a website designed to measure the walkability of an area, developed a 
system which rewards the maximum amount of points to those addresses that are within a 
quarter-mile walk. The Journal for Preventative Medicine (2012) supports this notion, suggesting 
that the distance of approximately a quarter-mile is the standard frequently used to measure 
walkability research in the United States. The team added half-mile and mile buffers to give an 
additional perspective. Many variables could affect the feasibility of walking this distance such 
as age, physical ability, carrying children and/or pets, carrying heavy luggage, and warm 
summer weather that continues throughout much of hurricane season. 
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• Total Population
• Grandparents Living with Grandchildren (8 and under)
• Grandparent as Guardian
• Household with 1 or More Persons Age 60+
• Percentage of Households with 1 or More Persons Age 60+
• Population Age 25+
o Percentage with Less than High School Education
• Number of Persons with a Disability
• Percentage of Persons with a Disability
• Number of Households with no Vehicle
• Percentage with No Vehicle
• Population Age 5+
• Percentage Speak Language Other Than English
• Percentage Speak English Less than Very Well
• Percentage Below 100% Poverty Level
• Percentage Between 100% to 149% Poverty Level
• Percentage at or Above 150% Poverty Level
• Percentage of Households with Male Single Parent
• Percentage of Households with Female Single Parent
• Percentage of Households with Income less than $10,000
• Percentage of Households with Income between $10,000 and $14,999
• Percentage of Households with Income between $15,000 and $24,999
• Percentage of Households with Income between $25,000 and $34,999
• Percentage of Households with Income between $35,000 and $49,999
This process allowed the team to visualize which census tracts corresponded to each 
respective  Evacuspot, and make record of it. From the beginning of the 
process, the team decided to use spreadsheets for data collection, with the understanding that 
each location could have numerous census tracts attached. The team labeled each spreadsheet 
by the name of the location. The first column identified the specific GEOIDs for the census tract, 
and the second column provided the actual census tract number (see Table 1). The team 
identified census tracts for all of the 17 evacuation pick-up points.  
For the purpose of this analysis, the team relied on pre-existing census data, specifically the 
2014 American Community Survey (ACS). The ACS is a sample survey conducted by the 
Census Bureau to maintain socioeconomic data for areas throughout the United States. The 
2014 American Community Survey provided 60 months’ worth of collected data, offering an 
extensive sample size and reliable estimates relative to other available data (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2015). The 2014 American Community Survey has the most consistent and expansive 
data available for Orleans Parish. The ACS allowed the team to locate data at the census tract 
level. Utilizing the census data enabled the team to obtain information regarding the 
demographics of exact geographic areas. 
The team then collected data for relevant vulnerability indicators, which the team established 
through the review of the literature. In order to have a comprehensive understanding of the 
socioeconomic demographics in Orleans Parish, the team examined the following 
characteristics: 
		
	 	
	
9	
• Percentage of Families with Income Below Poverty Line 
• Percentage of Individuals with Income Below Poverty Line  
 
The team compiled the data for these characteristics into the aforementioned spreadsheet. Two 
graduate researchers crosschecked each sheet to ensure that each number and percentage 
was consistent with the census data. This ensured that the information was accurate, and 
resulted in a higher degree of reliability. The team then merged the spreadsheets for each 
individual Evacuspot location into a single file provided in Appendix D. This file consolidated 
every GEOID, census tract, and characteristic analyzed into one cohesive document for input 
into ArcGIS. The document provided the team with the raw data necessary for the processing 
and analysis discussed later in this report.  
 
Data Process and Analysis 
 
The first aspect of this study entailed creating the base map. The Census Bureau provides Tiger 
files, which display the Orleans Parish outline, 2015 census tracts, major waterways, primary 
roads, secondary roads, and railroad tracks. The team then acquired the coordinates for the 
Evacuspot pick-up points, and converted them into geocodes for input into the ArcGIS software. 
Once the team mapped the Evacuspots, the team created buffers to establish spatial context at 
the following markers: quarter-mile, half-mile, and mile radius. These buffers enabled the team 
to identify and record which census tracts corresponded to a given Evacuspot.  
 
Once the team determined the census tracts, the team sorted the 2014 American Community 
Survey data. The team then reformatted the raw data into spreadsheets compatible with the 
ArcGIS software. Two additional researchers reviewed this data extensively to ensure accuracy. 
Then, the team condensed each Evacuspot spreadsheet into a single spreadsheet with the 
appropriate formatting. The team formatted the spreadsheet by removing spaces between 
words, ensuring that values were “numbers” or “text” where necessary, and creating appropriate 
GEOID codes. The team developed GEOID codes for each census tract, which utilize 11 digits 
to represent state, parish, and tract in a format compatible with ArcGIS.  
 
The team then populated the census data into the initial base map. This process created the 
infrastructure for the social vulnerability index, as it allowed the team to identify patterns in 
vulnerability throughout the parish. Using existing literature and research, the team 
characterized nine socioeconomic variables into three tiers, prioritizing the factors as they 
related to evacuation needs. After the team selected the ranking, the team added a multiplier of 
one, two, or three to emphasize the priority. For example, the High Priority tier has a multiplier of 
three, because these variables play a much more significant role in determining accessibility, 
while the Low Priority tier has a multiplier of one, because these variables do not impact self 
evacuation as intensely. The tier system is as follows: 
 
• High Priority (Multiplier of Three) 
o Disabled  
o Elderly  
o Carless 
• Medium Priority (Multiplier of Two)  
o Race 
o Education (% with <HS degree)  
o Income <$25k 
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o Poverty
• Low Priority (Multiplier of One)
o Single Parenthood
o Language
The team then used the resulting values from the weighted scale to populate a chart, and create 
the map layer corresponding to the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI). The overlay of these 
layers, in combination with color-coded census tracts, allowed the team to see how vulnerable 
populations were being served by the Evacuspots.  
Step-by-Step Overview of Data Process and Analysis 
1. Obtain relevant shapefiles from the Census Bureau’s recent Tiger files resource,
including: Orleans Parish outline, 2015 census tracts, major waterways, primary and
secondary roads, and railroads
2. Determine the location of evacuation pick-up points
3. Develop quarter-mile, half-mile, and mile radius buffers around each Evacuspot
4. Identify and record the corresponding census tracts for each Evacuspot
5. Obtain relevant data (ACS 2014 5-year estimate)
6. Create spreadsheet with demographic data for Evacuspot
7. Condense data to a single excel spreadsheet
8. Reformat the excel spreadsheet for compatibility with ArcGIS
9. Develop a weighted three-tier system for determining social vulnerability
10. Populate table with new weighted values
11. Implement new values into ArcGIS to create a SoVI layers
Table 4: Brief Overview of Data Process and Analysis 
Findings 
The team produced numerous maps that demonstrate the overall social vulnerability in Orleans 
Parish relative to the Evacuspots. The SoVI layer indicates the areas with clusters of vulnerable 
populations throughout the city New Orleans. As the legend in the maps indicates, green areas 
have the lowest levels of social vulnerability, with an average score of 1-30 on the SoVI scale. 
Orange areas have moderate levels of vulnerability, with an average of 31-40 on the SoVI scale. 
The color red depicts the highest level of vulnerability, with an average of 41-52 on the SoVI 
scale. The team mapped buffers at distances of quarter-mile, half-mile and mile to illustrate the 
multiple ranges covered by any given Evacuspot, shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. 
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Figure 2 demonstrates the social vulnerability present within a quarter-mile radius of each given 
Evacuspot. The circles surrounding each Evacuspot reflect a quarter-mile distance, which is the 
optimal walking distance designated by WalkScore and the Journal of Preventative Medicine. 
However, given the constraint on resources, expansiveness of Orleans Parish, and variety of 
other circumstances, the team decided to provide maps demonstrating social vulnerability within 
a half-mile (Figure 3), and mile (Figure 4) of each Evacuspot as well.  
Figure 2 - Social Vulnerability Index with Quarter Mile Buffer 
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Figure 3 illustrates which census tracts, or portions of census tracts, are within a half-mile of 
each given Evacuspot. As expected, this covers a larger surface area, but some of the most 
socially vulnerable census tracts still remain out of the circumference of the half-mile buffers. 
Individuals on the outer edges of the buffers would have to commute a distance of half a mile to 
reach an Evacuspot. 
Figure 3: Social Vulnerability Index with Half-mile Buffer 
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Figure 4 provides a one-mile buffer surrounding each Evacuspot. Individuals on the outside 
edges of each circle would have to commute up to a mile to reach the Evacuspot. There are 
some census tracts with high levels of social vulnerability, such as those in the 7th Ward, St. 
Roch, and lower Algiers, that are not within a mile range of an Evacuspot.  
The community vulnerability mapping demonstrated mixed results. Some of the evacuation pick-
up points appear to adequately correspond to neighboring vulnerable populations. However, a 
number of the Evacuspots may not sufficiently provide coverage for the corresponding 
vulnerable communities. The largest discrepancies in the Evacuspot pick-up network occur in 
the New Orleans East and Gentilly areas of the parish (see Figure 4).  
Figure 4: Social Vulnerability Index with Mile Buffer 
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Figure 5: Social Vulnerability Surrounding Gentilly Mall and Smith Library Evacuspots 
 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates the relationship between vulnerable populations and distance from the 
Gentilly Mall Evacuspot. While the Gentilly area only has a moderate level of social vulnerability, 
the extensive distances make it a serious concern regarding accessibility. For example, the 
Gentilly Mall Evacuspot is located near an area of high social vulnerability, but portions of the 
census tract are not covered by the mile radius, much less the half-mile and quarter mile radius. 
On the other hand, the Smith Library Bus Stop has the opposite problem, as it is located in the 
Lakeview neighborhood, which has some of the lowest levels of social vulnerability in the parish. 
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The two Evacuspots located in New Orleans East also reflect the relationship between 
excessive distance and vulnerability (see Figure 6). The surrounding census tracts are 
predominantly orange, signifying moderate levels of social vulnerability throughout the area. The 
distance from the exterior census tracts could prove challenging to individuals with accessibility 
issues, given the limited public transportation available in the area.  
 
Figure 6: Social Vulnerability Surrounding New Orleans East Evacuspots 
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Furthermore, the West Bank area has two pick-up points, including a senior center, serving the 
neighboring Algiers and Algiers Point neighborhoods. The O.P Walker and Arthur Monday 
Evacuspots cover a considerable portion of the moderately vulnerable (orange) census tracts 
located in Algiers; however, the highly vulnerable (red) census tracts in Algiers are neither a 
quarter mile nor a half a mile away from these locations. The most vulnerable populations on 
the West Bank reside outside of these areas and would have to cover significant distances to 
reach either Evacuspot. 
 
Figure 7: Social Vulnerability Surrounding Algiers Evacuspots 
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A similar pattern occurs in the Hollygrove neighborhood. The closest Evacuspot for this 
neighborhood is the Palmer Park location. The majority of the census tracts in the neighborhood 
are beyond a quarter-mile and half-mile radius of the Palmer Park location, which would require 
residents to walk a mile to reach the Evacuspot. Meanwhile, the Uptown region, which contains 
some of the least vulnerable census tracts within the Parish (green), is accessible to most 
census tracts within a quarter and a half mile walk. The areas in proximity to this, which contain 
moderate to severe social vulnerability, require a mile distance to arrive to one of the three 
Evacuspots in the area (Palmer Park, Mater Dolorosa, and McMain High School). The census 
tracts in Central City closest to these three Evacuspots are relatively well covered, but there is a 
significant lapse between locations that leaves portions of the most vulnerable populations 
outside of the mile radius.  
 
Figure 8: Social Vulnerability Surrounding Palmer Park, Mater Dolorosa, and McMain 
High School 
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There are two Evacuspots in the area of the 7th ward, the Stallings Center and the Sanchez 
Center. These spots are surrounded by some of the more moderate and severe levels of social 
vulnerability throughout Orleans Parish, and many census tracts are out of range of either 
Evacuspot.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The social vulnerability analysis of Orleans Parish relative to the Evacuspots demonstrates the 
dichotomy that exists in coverage; some Evacuspots provide a suitable range of coverage, while 
others show significant gaps for vulnerable populations. Researchers could expand the mapping 
of community vulnerability using locally-held data, such as data derived from agency databases. 
The vulnerability maps developed by the project team are the preliminary steps to 
understanding the relationship between Evacuspots and vulnerable communities within the city 
New Orleans. This study illustrates potential areas for improvement in Evacuspot placement, 
and the necessity of adapting to continuously changing demographics, in order to ensure that 
the needs of the most vulnerable populations are met prior to an evacuation.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Social Vulnerability in the 7th Ward 
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Appendix A – List of Research Questions 
List of Research Questions 
• Where are vulnerable populations throughout Orleans Parish?  
o Where are these communities relative to the Evacuspot locations?  
• Do the Evacuspot locations adequately serve vulnerable populations?  
o Are there any gaps in the populations served?  
o Are there any redundancies with the existing Evacuspots?  
o Are there any Evacuspots in places that may not need them? 
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Appendix B – Social Vulnerability Indicators 
Social Vulnerability Indicators 
1. Disabled population (Disabled) 
2. Population without vehicles (No Vehicles) 
3. Population 60 years old and older (60+) 
4. Minority population (Minority) 
5. Population who earn less than $25,000 per year (Earn <25k/year) 
6. Population in poverty (Poverty) 
7. Population with less than a high school diploma (<HS) 
8. Single parent households (Single Parent HHs) 
9. Population who speak a language other than English (Other than English) 
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Appendix C – Evacuspot Map 
  
		
Appendix D – Census Data 
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Census Tract 1, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2670 1328 343 0.258 2092 0.170 432 0.162 199 0.150 2537 0.110 0.022 0.198 0.086 0.716 
Census Tract 2, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1213 546 177 0.324 835 0.266 280 0.231 169 0.310 1101 0.067 0.024 0.289 0.115 0.596 
Census Tract 3, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1106 493 196 0.398 807 0.261 232 0.210 148 0.300 1086 0.020 0.014 0.392 0.203 0.406 
Census Tract 4, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2460 904 282 0.312 1480 0.165 361 0.147 140 0.155 2155 0.026 0.010 0.346 0.155 0.499 
Census Tract 6.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
937 314 112 0.357 455 0.532 126 0.134 157 0.500 725 0.000 0.000 0.693 0.110 0.197 
Census Tract 6.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2960 958 420 0.438 1736 0.249 458 0.155 155 0.162 2752 0.045 0.005 0.359 0.191 0.450 
Census Tract 6.03, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1162 454 132 0.291 767 0.334 207 0.178 182 0.401 1091 0.282 0.172 0.335 0.238 0.427 
Census Tract 6.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4703 1515 491 0.324 2684 0.180 715 0.152 295 0.195 4162 0.067 0.040 0.331 0.110 0.559 
Census Tract 6.05, 
Orleans Parish, 
2152 782 242 0.309 1335 0.201 429 0.219 115 0.147 1973 0.046 0.006 0.338 0.060 0.602 
		
	 	
	
25	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 6.06, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4555 1636 693 0.424 3224 0.058 690 0.159 51 0.031 4366 0.099 0.031 0.142 0.040 0.817 
Census Tract 6.07, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4529 1549 625 0.403 2961 0.059 466 0.104 59 0.038 4306 0.077 0.024 0.073 0.089 0.839 
Census Tract 6.11, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4367 1510 651 0.431 3199 0.214 654 0.150 176 0.117 4167 0.198 0.126 0.189 0.061 0.750 
Census Tract 6.12, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1528 538 200 0.372 1017 0.104 79 0.052 11 0.020 1420 0.094 0.036 0.088 0.015 0.897 
Census Tract 6.13, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4950 2052 815 0.397 2748 0.231 869 0.176 989 0.482 4373 0.035 0.005 0.455 0.075 0.470 
Census Tract 6.15, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3508 1686 326 0.193 2314 0.202 466 0.133 168 0.100 3214 0.103 0.086 0.174 0.133 0.693 
Census Tract 6.16, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4200 1475 436 0.296 2816 0.051 400 0.100 129 0.087 3913 0.040 0.005 0.164 0.067 0.768 
Census Tract 6.17, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3734 1930 238 0.123 2620 0.082 293 0.084 154 0.080 3467 0.033 0.005 0.162 0.087 0.751 
Census Tract 6.18, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3924 1293 531 0.411 2575 0.046 438 0.112 50 0.039 3743 0.097 0.008 0.087 0.050 0.863 
Census Tract 7.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
571 222 107 0.482 415 0.345 104 0.182 59 0.266 565 0.004 0.002 0.375 0.137 0.489 
		
	 	
	
26	
Census Tract 7.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1705 611 200 0.327 1084 0.196 278 0.164 91 0.149 1638 0.000 0.000 0.388 0.110 0.502 
Census Tract 8, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1349 493 169 0.343 871 0.187 307 0.233 75 0.152 1234 0.027 0.015 0.389 0.036 0.574 
Census Tract 9.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
790 302 150 0.497 577 0.333 137 0.173 79 0.262 760 0.000 0.000 0.309 0.110 0.581 
Census Tract 9.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
689 145 53 0.366 460 0.309 128 0.186 4 0.028 657 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.276 0.556 
Census Tract 9.03, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
476 206 104 0.505 358 0.321 80 0.168 74 0.359 460 0.026 0.026 0.357 0.197 0.445 
Census Tract 9.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
842 354 204 0.576 542 0.426 196 0.233 135 0.381 773 0.028 0.013 0.436 0.197 0.367 
Census Tract 11, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1690 913 238 0.261 1428 0.139 233 0.138 192 0.210 1654 0.029 0.005 0.186 0.088 0.726 
Census Tract 12, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1589 887 218 0.246 1479 0.088 194 0.122 124 0.140 1546 0.032 0.018 0.183 0.140 0.678 
Census Tract 13.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1678 781 294 0.376 1272 0.245 320 0.201 286 0.366 1606 0.006 0.001 0.335 0.188 0.477 
Census Tract 13.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
889 439 121 0.276 640 0.384 218 0.245 162 0.369 850 0.040 0.006 0.476 0.146 0.378 
Census Tract 14.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
1248 528 232 0.439 837 0.257 250 0.200 127 0.241 1210 0.042 0.000 0.399 0.157 0.444 
		
	 	
	
27	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 14.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1768 759 265 0.349 1166 0.280 373 0.211 123 0.162 1610 0.016 0.012 0.348 0.153 0.499 
Census Tract 15, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
838 360 126 0.350 542 0.376 246 0.294 111 0.308 772 0.023 0.013 0.247 0.308 0.445 
Census Tract 16, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
0 0 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Census Tract 17.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1950 564 303 0.537 1236 0.193 459 0.236 30 0.053 1842 0.031 0.000 0.286 0.159 0.555 
Census Tract 17.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2982 923 364 0.394 1863 0.136 397 0.133 37 0.040 2745 0.059 0.040 0.206 0.106 0.688 
Census Tract 17.20, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3365 1193 348 0.292 1962 0.151 541 0.161 118 0.099 3060 0.013 0.007 0.393 0.207 0.400 
Census Tract 17.22, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4210 1616 631 0.390 2856 0.173 970 0.230 401 0.248 4060 0.024 0.000 0.266 0.132 0.602 
Census Tract 17.23, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
5070 1849 517 0.280 3010 0.098 531 0.105 199 0.108 4580 0.045 0.014 0.327 0.160 0.513 
Census Tract 17.24, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4619 1662 436 0.262 2780 0.146 583 0.130 286 0.172 4302 0.063 0.036 0.419 0.177 0.403 
Census Tract 17.25, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
6948 2414 116
4 
0.482 4360 0.192 110
3 
0.159 329 0.136 6581 0.038 0.023 0.350 0.109 0.541 
		
	 	
	
28	
Census Tract 17.30, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
902 287 86 0.300 541 0.227 111 0.123 11 0.038 837 0.010 0.006 0.398 0.072 0.530 
Census Tract 17.34, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
835 333 230 0.691 721 0.137 200 0.240 0 0.000 799 0.083 0.060 0.047 0.085 0.868 
Census Tract 17.35, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1969 804 195 0.243 1119 0.169 270 0.137 164 0.204 1735 0.044 0.007 0.413 0.119 0.468 
Census Tract 17.36, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2072 800 219 0.274 1408 0.211 275 0.135 198 0.248 1898 0.064 0.026 0.311 0.089 0.601 
Census Tract 17.37, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3161 1295 278 0.215 1912 0.110 333 0.105 180 0.139 2816 0.011 0.002 0.347 0.149 0.504 
Census Tract 17.39, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1708 573 236 0.412 1195 0.078 101 0.059 11 0.019 1626 0.003 0.000 0.186 0.104 0.711 
Census Tract 17.40, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4626 1793 444 0.248 2651 0.089 373 0.081 208 0.116 4280 0.028 0.007 0.254 0.115 0.631 
Census Tract 17.41, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1611 480 215 0.448 1061 0.295 126 0.078 35 0.073 1487 0.339 0.198 0.296 0.205 0.499 
Census Tract 17.43, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2377 939 190 0.202 1397 0.189 379 0.159 201 0.214 2093 0.007 0.007 0.407 0.184 0.408 
Census Tract 17.44, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4211 1409 244 0.173 2088 0.216 307 0.073 312 0.221 3702 0.011 0.011 0.458 0.125 0.417 
Census Tract 17.45, 
Orleans Parish, 
3394 1339 425 0.317 2221 0.206 382 0.113 152 0.114 3079 0.059 0.026 0.408 0.162 0.430 
		
	 	
	
29	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 17.46, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4465 1623 408 0.251 2688 0.233 467 0.106 193 0.119 4118 0.007 0.002 0.339 0.126 0.535 
Census Tract 17.47, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3838 1272 457 0.359 2582 0.056 347 0.090 0 0.000 3604 0.172 0.057 0.040 0.105 0.855 
Census Tract 17.48, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4892 1501 400 0.266 2859 0.164 555 0.113 97 0.065 4518 0.124 0.074 0.265 0.048 0.686 
Census Tract 17.49, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2974 840 229 0.273 1775 0.357 239 0.081 73 0.087 2734 0.580 0.384 0.289 0.203 0.508 
Census Tract 17.50, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3441 1153 291 0.252 2234 0.414 332 0.096 234 0.203 3074 0.753 0.479 0.387 0.106 0.507 
Census Tract 17.51, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
802 268 89 0.332 515 0.348 190 0.268 143 0.534 758 0.206 0.117 0.676 0.134 0.190 
Census Tract 18, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1436 700 145 0.207 1265 0.020 88 0.061 87 0.124 1412 0.067 0.011 0.184 0.099 0.717 
Census Tract 19, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1339 644 232 0.360 1072 0.262 236 0.178 306 0.475 1286 0.103 0.077 0.404 0.100 0.496 
Census Tract 20, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1084 516 161 0.312 727 0.248 189 0.174 231 0.448 1002 0.001 0.000 0.425 0.077 0.499 
Census Tract 21, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
717 367 121 0.330 497 0.330 214 0.298 156 0.425 654 0.000 0.000 0.417 0.215 0.368 
		
	 	
	
30	
Census Tract 22, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
825 402 151 0.376 615 0.335 183 0.222 141 0.351 743 0.015 0.007 0.347 0.085 0.568 
Census Tract 23, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1799 817 297 0.364 1408 0.190 406 0.237 221 0.271 1715 0.041 0.027 0.312 0.097 0.591 
Census Tract 24.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2033 769 256 0.333 1456 0.173 218 0.107 70 0.091 1847 0.016 0.004 0.198 0.080 0.722 
Census Tract 24.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2917 1218 342 0.281 1954 0.140 440 0.151 248 0.204 2815 0.022 0.010 0.313 0.110 0.577 
Census Tract 25.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1703 674 210 0.312 1138 0.163 319 0.187 125 0.185 1534 0.095 0.050 0.204 0.156 0.640 
Census Tract 25.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2170 812 293 0.361 1405 0.149 428 0.197 148 0.182 2075 0.046 0.021 0.326 0.100 0.574 
Census Tract 25.03, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2328 808 292 0.361 1665 0.098 350 0.151 49 0.061 2175 0.035 0.012 0.107 0.072 0.821 
Census Tract 25.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2250 929 269 0.290 1557 0.102 348 0.155 102 0.110 2073 0.072 0.011 0.186 0.112 0.702 
Census Tract 26, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1317 978 407 0.416 1289 0.116 290 0.220 311 0.318 1308 0.106 0.037 0.247 0.058 0.695 
Census Tract 27, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1497 615 171 0.278 1187 0.191 279 0.186 287 0.467 1430 0.117 0.008 0.311 0.172 0.516 
Census Tract 28, 
Orleans Parish, 
1536 641 187 0.292 1042 0.105 258 0.168 222 0.346 1496 0.070 0.001 0.332 0.107 0.561 
		
	 	
	
31	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 29, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1436 564 99 0.176 881 0.334 315 0.219 167 0.296 1351 0.015 0.015 0.416 0.120 0.464 
Census Tract 30, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1145 481 178 0.370 702 0.242 229 0.200 220 0.457 1040 0.021 0.006 0.500 0.218 0.282 
Census Tract 31, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1093 450 157 0.349 729 0.158 208 0.190 60 0.133 1048 0.018 0.004 0.469 0.094 0.436 
Census Tract 33.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1833 681 206 0.302 1262 0.046 235 0.129 32 0.047 1695 0.084 0.022 0.150 0.117 0.733 
Census Tract 33.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3587 1214 523 0.431 2364 0.132 536 0.149 59 0.049 3223 0.045 0.007 0.230 0.096 0.674 
Census Tract 33.03, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1928 839 157 0.187 1162 0.189 222 0.115 94 0.112 1825 0.155 0.035 0.300 0.136 0.564 
Census Tract 33.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1856 765 212 0.277 1142 0.180 127 0.068 131 0.171 1688 0.047 0.017 0.371 0.102 0.527 
Census Tract 33.07, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1333 565 288 0.510 983 0.162 322 0.242 123 0.218 1302 0.020 0.005 0.221 0.114 0.665 
Census Tract 33.08, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3311 1361 647 0.475 2192 0.183 623 0.188 329 0.242 3189 0.060 0.010 0.248 0.197 0.556 
Census Tract 34, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1244 684 195 0.285 910 0.211 249 0.200 328 0.480 1189 0.076 0.046 0.368 0.130 0.503 
		
	 	
	
32	
Census Tract 35, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1195 620 183 0.295 924 0.213 207 0.173 201 0.324 1181 0.015 0.000 0.300 0.197 0.503 
Census Tract 36, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1838 813 238 0.293 1198 0.228 329 0.181 242 0.298 1682 0.060 0.029 0.451 0.126 0.423 
Census Tract 37.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2269 1030 423 0.411 1696 0.090 282 0.125 164 0.159 2214 0.083 0.019 0.207 0.050 0.743 
Census Tract 37.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3343 1655 535 0.323 2581 0.200 620 0.185 461 0.279 3199 0.037 0.000 0.390 0.095 0.515 
Census Tract 38, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1231 857 478 0.558 1155 0.038 160 0.131 289 0.337 1231 0.165 0.056 0.102 0.038 0.860 
Census Tract 39, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1366 665 159 0.239 1014 0.101 207 0.152 284 0.427 1292 0.161 0.039 0.320 0.105 0.575 
Census Tract 40, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2029 921 245 0.266 1493 0.216 430 0.212 420 0.456 1923 0.075 0.003 0.382 0.221 0.397 
Census Tract 41, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1577 789 208 0.264 1293 0.014 200 0.127 135 0.171 1525 0.094 0.003 0.126 0.050 0.824 
Census Tract 44.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1264 559 157 0.281 749 0.214 203 0.161 195 0.349 1188 0.036 0.004 0.637 0.140 0.223 
Census Tract 44.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
78 37 0 0.000 37 0.000 0 0.000 37 1.000 78 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.000 
Census Tract 45, 
Orleans Parish, 
2083 1042 212 0.203 1466 0.162 265 0.127 260 0.250 1919 0.095 0.043 0.372 0.160 0.468 
		
	 	
	
33	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 46, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2893 1501 265 0.177 2334 0.013 200 0.069 172 0.115 2776 0.091 0.000 0.135 0.057 0.808 
Census Tract 48, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1050 376 83 0.221 482 0.602 293 0.279 296 0.787 931 0.069 0.000 0.828 0.095 0.077 
Census Tract 49, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1457 661 200 0.303 1042 0.240 325 0.223 298 0.451 1352 0.139 0.077 0.585 0.107 0.308 
Census Tract 50, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1692 605 71 0.117 1205 0.327 138 0.082 108 0.179 1561 0.354 0.249 0.482 0.153 0.365 
Census Tract 54, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1853 1003 223 0.222 1489 0.087 248 0.135 127 0.127 1785 0.163 0.076 0.191 0.085 0.725 
Census Tract 55, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2660 1208 352 0.291 2010 0.037 289 0.110 21 0.017 2499 0.087 0.018 0.098 0.091 0.811 
Census Tract 56.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2270 876 226 0.258 1520 0.024 143 0.063 13 0.015 2071 0.142 0.007 0.083 0.026 0.892 
Census Tract 56.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2617 951 237 0.249 1832 0.006 207 0.079 17 0.018 2333 0.032 0.000 0.046 0.068 0.887 
Census Tract 56.03, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1394 611 155 0.254 1063 0.034 79 0.057 25 0.041 1286 0.093 0.033 0.105 0.023 0.872 
Census Tract 56.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1537 598 136 0.227 1112 0.048 120 0.078 0 0.000 1404 0.050 0.013 0.042 0.023 0.935 
		
	 	
	
34	
Census Tract 60, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1829 584 100 0.171 1094 0.271 195 0.126 121 0.207 1700 0.171 0.091 0.421 0.168 0.411 
Census Tract 63, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1777 669 153 0.229 1248 0.336 307 0.193 225 0.336 1697 0.298 0.196 0.420 0.171 0.409 
Census Tract 64, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2325 1028 171 0.166 1854 0.213 399 0.172 224 0.218 2281 0.135 0.064 0.272 0.167 0.562 
Census Tract 65, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2679 1184 263 0.222 1873 0.123 464 0.174 231 0.195 2463 0.181 0.074 0.292 0.132 0.576 
Census Tract 69, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
797 275 80 0.291 511 0.292 117 0.147 102 0.371 740 0.022 0.009 0.711 0.028 0.261 
Census Tract 70, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1801 206 70 0.340 381 0.160 163 0.091 92 0.447 1801 0.078 0.027 0.670 0.090 0.240 
Census Tract 71.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2277 1119 391 0.349 1804 0.292 345 0.184 485 0.433 2243 0.157 0.106 0.385 0.110 0.506 
Census Tract 72, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2185 1027 183 0.178 1299 0.242 341 0.158 415 0.404 2000 0.071 0.047 0.490 0.161 0.349 
Census Tract 75.01, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2762 970 431 0.444 1923 0.212 461 0.167 156 0.161 2652 0.026 0.015 0.341 0.113 0.546 
Census Tract 75.02, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2585 1007 418 0.415 1623 0.261 618 0.239 296 0.294 2440 0.100 0.027 0.453 0.190 0.356 
Census Tract 76.04, 
Orleans Parish, 
1758 655 232 0.354 1214 0.030 79 0.045 0 0.000 1661 0.122 0.065 0.036 0.014 0.949 
		
	 	
	
35	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 76.05, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1475 609 263 0.432 1066 0.316 295 0.200 206 0.338 1363 0.045 0.023 0.405 0.208 0.387 
Census Tract 76.06, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3859 1829 575 0.314 3024 0.035 308 0.080 74 0.040 3534 0.132 0.037 0.096 0.033 0.871 
Census Tract 77, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2577 1628 256 0.157 2180 0.056 182 0.072 177 0.109 2512 0.170 0.063 0.123 0.028 0.849 
Census Tract 78, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1631 671 78 0.116 1282 0.037 70 0.043 101 0.151 1502 0.332 0.071 0.185 0.021 0.794 
Census Tract 82, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1426 936 217 0.232 1258 0.071 198 0.141 159 0.170 1357 0.135 0.062 0.148 0.046 0.806 
Census Tract 83, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1147 553 189 0.342 900 0.086 131 0.114 82 0.148 1074 0.137 0.028 0.084 0.059 0.857 
Census Tract 84, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1228 694 237 0.341 937 0.234 240 0.197 225 0.324 1191 0.095 0.018 0.241 0.147 0.612 
Census Tract 85, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1268 575 239 0.416 1021 0.479 402 0.317 374 0.650 1268 0.200 0.099 0.493 0.143 0.363 
Census Tract 86, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
856 415 177 0.427 651 0.381 113 0.132 174 0.419 819 0.133 0.104 0.522 0.160 0.318 
Census Tract 88, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1891 867 185 0.213 1453 0.041 145 0.077 80 0.092 1816 0.062 0.000 0.143 0.047 0.810 
		
	 	
	
36	
Census Tract 90, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1959 1019 394 0.387 1507 0.014 145 0.074 67 0.066 1911 0.111 0.000 0.084 0.052 0.865 
Census Tract 91, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2422 1118 249 0.223 1909 0.101 295 0.122 310 0.277 2209 0.206 0.149 0.386 0.125 0.490 
Census Tract 92, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1488 609 190 0.312 923 0.269 314 0.211 311 0.511 1376 0.042 0.008 0.413 0.261 0.325 
Census Tract 94, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1299 502 95 0.189 781 0.346 281 0.216 247 0.492 1187 0.079 0.064 0.527 0.197 0.276 
Census Tract 96, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1594 736 170 0.231 1240 0.089 187 0.117 79 0.107 1524 0.106 0.032 0.077 0.150 0.773 
Census Tract 97, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1666 721 214 0.297 1359 0.092 146 0.088 44 0.061 1583 0.180 0.048 0.200 0.107 0.693 
Census Tract 99, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3080 1438 327 0.227 2370 0.043 231 0.083 144 0.100 2935 0.124 0.022 0.176 0.052 0.771 
Census Tract 100, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1911 764 159 0.208 1212 0.166 143 0.075 324 0.424 1823 0.078 0.027 0.525 0.095 0.381 
Census Tract 101, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1887 925 375 0.405 1497 0.086 230 0.122 98 0.106 1843 0.038 0.001 0.233 0.046 0.721 
Census Tract 102, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1478 736 232 0.315 1061 0.105 179 0.121 195 0.265 1402 0.011 0.000 0.418 0.102 0.480 
Census Tract 103, 
Orleans Parish, 
2867 1033 382 0.370 1765 0.277 337 0.118 297 0.288 2690 0.014 0.010 0.342 0.255 0.403 
		
	 	
	
37	
Louisiana 
Census Tract 106, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1299 682 223 0.327 1112 0.155 257 0.206 119 0.174 1204 0.134 0.062 0.132 0.059 0.810 
Census Tract 107, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1691 873 170 0.195 1314 0.011 84 0.050 78 0.089 1603 0.097 0.024 0.113 0.042 0.845 
Census Tract 108, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1320 665 227 0.341 1045 0.012 83 0.063 28 0.042 1204 0.110 0.004 0.075 0.014 0.911 
Census Tract 109, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
3507 1426 437 0.306 2636 0.069 419 0.119 150 0.105 3341 0.051 0.002 0.134 0.062 0.804 
Census Tract 111, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1484 637 269 0.422 1059 0.189 354 0.239 125 0.196 1393 0.066 0.030 0.339 0.055 0.607 
Census Tract 112, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1580 597 119 0.199 1226 0.040 153 0.098 47 0.079 1507 0.078 0.042 0.209 0.041 0.749 
Census Tract 114, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1833 1000 291 0.291 1481 0.021 167 0.092 20 0.020 1748 0.165 0.026 0.078 0.044 0.878 
Census Tract 115, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1347 636 240 0.377 1088 0.052 176 0.133 54 0.085 1278 0.126 0.021 0.095 0.045 0.860 
Census Tract 116, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1442 658 261 0.397 1153 0.049 69 0.051 9 0.014 1355 0.077 0.020 0.053 0.021 0.926 
Census Tract 117, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2505 1095 443 0.405 1795 0.000 178 0.071 16 0.015 2427 0.075 0.009 0.058 0.009 0.933 
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Census Tract 119, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1882 698 133 0.191 1138 0.004 50 0.027 17 0.024 1815 0.095 0.031 0.230 0.034 0.736 
Census Tract 120, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1519 680 241 0.354 1054 0.009 130 0.086 57 0.084 1427 0.197 0.025 0.202 0.026 0.773 
Census Tract 
121.01, Orleans 
Parish, Louisiana 
3348 835 170 0.204 1246 0.008 209 0.062 53 0.063 3220 0.190 0.025 0.288 0.072 0.640 
Census Tract 
121.02, Orleans 
Parish, Louisiana 
4174 438 165 0.377 606 0.030 228 0.055 30 0.068 4139 0.137 0.051 0.412 0.004 0.584 
Census Tract 122, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2326 921 232 0.252 1641 0.021 180 0.078 15 0.016 2158 0.060 0.008 0.100 0.055 0.845 
Census Tract 123, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2023 909 200 0.220 1538 0.146 122 0.060 150 0.165 1895 0.108 0.055 0.236 0.060 0.704 
Census Tract 124, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1750 672 185 0.275 1106 0.107 194 0.111 72 0.107 1656 0.166 0.001 0.281 0.069 0.650 
Census Tract 125, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1522 806 242 0.300 1195 0.076 122 0.082 87 0.108 1463 0.181 0.051 0.218 0.057 0.725 
Census Tract 126, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1880 881 179 0.203 1249 0.043 179 0.095 130 0.148 1784 0.101 0.043 0.239 0.047 0.714 
Census Tract 127, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2224 1007 305 0.303 1665 0.101 2
8
4 
0.129 128 0.127 2104 0.092 0.006 0.240 0.051 0.710 
Census Tract 128, 
Orleans Parish, 
2340 971 250 0.257 1668 0.056 122 0.054 63 0.065 2187 0.118 0.030 0.129 0.066 0.805 
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Census Tract 129, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1410 753 244 0.324 1100 0.150 186 0.132 139 0.185 1362 0.101 0.023 0.258 0.058 0.684 
Census Tract 130, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1842 746 224 0.300 1218 0.140 187 0.102 118 0.158 1692 0.028 0.018 0.421 0.098 0.481 
Census Tract 131, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1467 561 139 0.248 883 0.186 145 0.099 177 0.316 1296 0.085 0.046 0.532 0.050 0.418 
Census Tract 132, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2600 1060 422 0.398 1930 0.195 398 0.153 149 0.141 2521 0.102 0.026 0.285 0.066 0.649 
Census Tract 
133.01, Orleans 
Parish, Louisiana 
3604 1411 636 0.451 2544 0.019 396 0.110 23 0.016 3285 0.104 0.020 0.041 0.048 0.911 
Census Tract 
133.02, Orleans 
Parish, Louisiana 
2182 881 363 0.412 1594 0.004 196 0.090 141 0.160 2152 0.130 0.043 0.159 0.020 0.821 
Census Tract 134, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2294 1449 390 0.269 1935 0.104 523 0.229 415 0.286 2245 0.179 0.046 0.336 0.066 0.599 
Census Tract 135, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2097 1302 577 0.443 2071 0.069 216 0.104 582 0.447 2097 0.174 0.030 0.125 0.038 0.836 
Census Tract 136, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1036 427 56 0.131 807 0.243 174 0.168 50 0.117 942 0.126 0.007 0.141 0.224 0.635 
Census Tract 137, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2281 802 310 0.387 1139 0.313 345 0.152 233 0.291 2050 0.030 0.017 0.597 0.095 0.309 
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Census Tract 138, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2021 814 183 0.225 1106 0.226 290 0.144 230 0.283 1770 0.013 0.001 0.352 0.132 0.516 
Census Tract 139, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1595 872 151 0.173 1335 0.087 172 0.108 103 0.118 1571 0.162 0.027 0.181 0.157 0.662 
Census Tract 140, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1608 867 332 0.383 991 0.503 545 0.339 559 0.645 1452 0.074 0.055 0.660 0.127 0.213 
Census Tract 141, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
2119 1056 304 0.288 1582 0.200 474 0.225 385 0.365 2082 0.012 0.000 0.335 0.194 0.471 
Census Tract 142, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1738 937 219 0.234 1517 0.123 251 0.144 142 0.152 1633 0.053 0.015 0.131 0.090 0.779 
Census Tract 143, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1704 710 245 0.345 893 0.329 498 0.292 361 0.508 1479 0.130 0.076 0.567 0.139 0.293 
Census Tract 144, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1980 807 244 0.302 1507 0.261 296 0.149 154 0.191 1889 0.172 0.094 0.166 0.249 0.585 
Census Tract 145, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
1494 0 0 0.000 1095 0.249 0 0.000 0 0.000 1494 0.065 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Census Tract 9800, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
4 0 0 0.000 4 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 4 0.750 0.000 0.500 0.500 0.000 
Census Tract 9801, 
Orleans Parish, 
Louisiana 
0 0 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Census Tract 9900, 
Orleans Parish, 
0 0 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Quarter Mile Walkability Map 
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Half Mile Walkability Map 
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One Mile Walkability Map 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – Algiers 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – Uptown 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – New Orleans East 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – Gentilly 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – Lakeview 
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Social Vulnerability Index Map – Lower 9th 
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Social Vulnerability Index and Special Needs Registry Comparison Report 
Introduction 
This report compares the Social Vulnerability Index (SoVI) developed by UNO-CHART with the 
locations of the individuals on the Special Needs Registry (SNR). The SoVI maps the vulnerable 
populations based on census data, while the SNR is a roster of residents who self-identify as 
special needs and register with the New Orleans Health Department, in order to receive 
evacuation help in the event of a disaster. The purpose of the comparison is to determine the 
accuracy of the SoVI in regards to the actual self-identified vulnerable populations in the City of 
New Orleans.  
Methodology 
The project team geocoded the SNR data provided by the New Orleans Health Department in 
order to input it into GIS. The team mapped the approximate address of the Special Needs 
residents, and then counted the number of special needs residents within a census tract. 
Similarly to the SoVI, the team assigned a graduated color scheme in order to demonstrate the 
concentration of Special Needs residents throughout the city. In addition to Special Needs 
residents, the team plotted the location of services and centers that would require special 
attention in case of a mandatory evacuation. These centers include nursing homes, adult living 
facilities, child care centers, dialysis providers, and prisons. 
In order to complete this comparison, the team uploaded the SoVI polygon layer, and the 
Special Needs Residents polygon layer to ArcGIS online. Using the web map application 
builder, the team selected a slider format in order to compare both datasets in real time. For 
consistency, the team classifed both the SoVI and SNR polygon layers using the natural breaks 
(jenks) method of classification, and then rounded the numbers to the nearest multiple of five 
where applicable. Since most census tracts only contained one Special Needs resident, while 
others had as many as 203 residents, the team classied the Special Needs dataset as such: 0-
1, 2-15, 16-30, 50-203. Comparatively, the team separated the SoVI polygon layer into four 
classes: 0-1, 2-30, 31-40, and 41-52. 
2 
Discussion 
 
Figure 1 - City of New Orleans SoVI 
Figure 2 - City of New Orleans Special Needs Registry 
 3 
Figure 1 illustrates the spatial arrangement of social vulnerability within the city of New Orleans, 
while Figure 2 shows the location and concentration of Special Needs residents. Dark green 
represents low social vulnerability Figure 1, while dark green on Figure 2 represents a single 
special needs resident living within that specific tract. The dark red areas in Figure 1 represent a 
high social vulnerability score, while the dark red areas in Figure 2 represent between 50 and 
203 Special Needs residents residing in that census tract. Although not a direct correlation, the 
two datasets show that conditions of high social vulnerability occur in neighborhoods such as 
Central City, Treme, the 7th ward, and Gentilly. However, the majority of tracts that appear red 
on the SNR map are a result of numerous adult living facilities and nursing homes located within 
the census tract, demarcated by a blue cross for adult living facilities and a yellow cross for 
nursing homes.   
 
 
Figure 3 - City of New Orleans Special Needs Registry - Garden District 
 
Figure 3 reveals that the areas containing the most Special Needs residents appear to be in the 
Central Business District. This is likely a result of the approximately 7 adult living facilities within 
these two tracts. This pattern is evident throughout the Garden District, where tracts colored 
either yellow or orange also have at least one adult living facility within their boundaries.  While 
this neighborhood has multiple census tracts that contain multiple living facilities, there are only 
15 residents classified as having Special Needs in those tracts. Anomalies such as this provide 
a great insight into how the city can improve its evacuation planning. The city can presume 
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certain areas have more Special Needs residents based on concentration of living facilities. The 
city could even contact these living facilities directly to investigate if there are additional 
residents that ought to be added to the registry. 
Figure 4 - City of New Orleans Special Needs Registry - Central City 
Figure 5 - City of New Orleans Special Needs Registry - Lakeview 
5 
Figure 6 - City of New Orleans Special Needs Registry - Algiers 
This pattern continues throughout Central City, Lakeview, and into Algiers (see Figures 4, 5, 
and 6). However, the presence of living facilities does not directly correlate with the number of 
Special Needs residents living within a particular census tract. For example, in Lakeview, there 
are three census tracts with a high number of Special Needs residents. Two of these tracts have 
more than one adult facility within their boundaries. However, one tract has no facilities, yet is 
home to between 16 and 30 Special Needs residents. 
The above maps could help the city plan for its vulnerable residents by considering both the 
Special Needs Registry and other facilities that house vulnerable populations. In an evacuation, 
it is simpler to coordinate services for a variety of Special Needs residents if they all reside in 
the same facility. However, the presence of census tracts with many Special Needs residents 
and no facilities indicate that the residents requiring special attention are likely scattered 
throughout the census tract, which could require additional time and transportation when a 
mandatory evacuation is called. 
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Database Analysis and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The research team examined the utility of three databases that contribute to the City Assisted 
Evacuation Process. The databases included the CAEP database, the Special Needs Registry, 
and the RTA’s Paratransit database. 
The New Orleans Office of Homeland Security & Emergency Preparedness (NOHSEP) 
maintains the CAEP database. NOHSEP developed the framework for the database with 
stakeholder input from the city’s public safety agencies and state/federal entities. The intake 
form for the database is located on the city’s website (ready.nola.gov/plan/hurricane/#cae). 
NOHSEP updates the database on a rolling basis throughout the year, and exercises 
components of the database as needed. When individuals register online or call 311 to register, 
the city enters them into the database (which is on the Wufoo platform). The information 
collected is: apt/house number, street name, zip code, number of people at the address, 
number of pets at the address, and closest pickup point.  
The New Orleans Health Department maintains the Special Needs Registry. The Special Needs 
Registry is a registry of individuals who require extra assistance during emergencies for medical 
or mobility reasons. This includes individuals that use a respirator, ventilator, or other at home 
medical equipment; use mobility equipment such as a wheelchair, scooter, walker, cane; are 
visually impaired, blind, hard of hearing or deaf; have cognitive, developmental of mental health 
disabilities; require dialysis or LVAD; or use assistive animals or prosthesis. The main purpose 
of the database is to identify people who are unable to walk to their closest Evacuspot.   
Registrants sign up for the Special Needs Registry online at ready.nola.gov or by calling 311. 
The New Orleans Health Department also does onsite registrations at outreach events during 
hurricane season. Case managers, home health providers, etc. can also register their clients. 
The Health Department then reviews the application to determine shelter and transportation 
types. Finally, a letter with transportation type and instructions are mailed to the registrant. The 
Health Department maintains the database by sending a “Happy Birthday” postcard, mailed to 
each registrant on their birthday month. The postcard asks the person to call the Health 
Department to update their information. If the person has not called by the end of the month, the 
Health Department attempts to call them three times. If someone does not answer after three 
attempts, the Health Department sends a letter stating that the Health Department cannot 
provide services unless called back. The resident is then marked in the database as “unable to 
contact” until they call the Health Department. Once a year, on June 1st, the Health Department 
sends everyone on the list a letter reminding them of their status. As a result, many people call 
to update their information.  
The RTA’s Paratransit database uses the booking system Trapeze Software.  Prospective 
registrants must have ADA eligibility, i.e. a disability that prevents them from using regular fixed 
route buses and streetcars. The RTA Paratransit database contains the name, address, phone 
number and mobility needs (wheelchair, scooter, walker or ambulatory) for active riders. The 
database also contains customer information such as SSN, DOB, Medicaid number, and 
medical information. The RTA Paratransit database further includes geocoding for each 
customer’s home address, as well as all trips they have taken over the past 15 years. 
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Findings 
1. There is a disparate range of information and maintenance on the three databases.
While the Public Health database is maintained on a commendably rigorous schedule,
the CAEP is maintained to a lesser degree. The CAEP does not collect the names of
people; only location and number of people/pets at the address. The RTA’s Paratransit
database is supported by the RTA’s IT department and Trapeze Customer Care. The
Paratransit Department and the RTA’s ID Center are responsible for data content (to
ensure ADA eligibility).
2. There is a marked lack of cooperation/coordination between the city and the RTA on a
routine basis.
3. Many special needs citizens that were transported by the RTA as a result of calls for
service assumed they did not need to register for the CAEP as “the city knows where I
am.”  However, Paratransit riders are not automatically entered into the Special Needs
Registry. Therefore, these residents could be left behind during a mandatory evacuation.
4. Evacuspots are not optimally located. Multiple Evacuspots are located in areas where
need is minimal, while other areas with high degrees of social vulnerability, have minimal
or no Evacuspots.
Recommendations 
1. UNO-CHART recommends that the city explore a consolidation of the three databases.
Much of the information collected across all three databases is redundant. We suggest
that the city identify and develop common information, and establish one centralized
database. This would make the data collection process more efficient and effective, and
consolidate and reduce the resources needed for multiple databases. UNO-CHART
further recommends that the city conduct an annual database update to ensure
currency.
2. UNO-CHART recommends that RTA drivers who respond to Paratransit service calls
update their passengers’ database information on a per-call basis. This might be
accomplished by providing drivers with a tablet device (iPad or equivalent) with
appropriate input fields for capturing database fields. This information could then be
seamlessly uploaded into the city’s database. The net effect could be that, while RTA
drivers would collect riders’ data, the RTA would not bear the burden of maintaining the
consolidated database.
3. UNO-CHART recommends that the city work with their GIS office to integrate database
address data into GIS maps. This would provide emergency managers with an effective
way to see where the city’s most vulnerable populations are physically located, and
would be especially useful in crisis evacuation, such as during short-lead time events
like pumping failures during flooding and HASMAT incidents.
4. UNO-CHART recommends that the city use the GIS information generated in
Recommendation 3 to better locate Evacuspots. The GIS information, reinforced and
combined with vulnerability mapping, would better inform evacuation planners as to how
to optimize Evacuspot locations.
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Implementing and Evaluating Risk Communication Strategies for Vulnerable Populations 
Many of the fundamentals of risk communication involve the understanding that risk 
communication should be viewed as a “two-way process, interactive and long-term,” wherein 
the public frequently engages with risk communicators in conversation (Ng and Hamby, 1982, 
p.2). However, when risk communication messages are developed, many organizations fail to
take into consideration whether their messages can reach communities that “do not understand
English, have visual or hearing impairments, or are otherwise isolated due to medical or
economic circumstances” (Klaiman et al., 2010, p. 246). Research demonstrates that vulnerable
populations have differing, and often more challenging, experiences before and after an
emergency compared to the general population (Perry, Linedell, Green, 1982, p.97). This paper
seeks to address two shortcomings that frequently occur in the realm of risk communication –
the lack of comprehensive strategies that take into account the needs of diverse vulnerable
populations, and how to effectively evaluate current risk communication programs to ensure
they reach those communities.
Literature Review 
Numerous studies conducted by the Federal Transit Authority concluded that local governments 
face substantial difficulty “identifying, communicating with, and maintaining accurate lists of 
individuals who may need assistance when emergencies arise” (Turner et al., 2010, p.159). 
These problems were typically associated with a fundamental lack of knowledge about the 
vulnerable populations within their cities. Many of the local governments were unable to identify 
who was vulnerable, to locate these vulnerable populations, and therefore to make decisions on 
what type of assistance these communities needed (Turner et al., 2010, p.159). According to a 
national study, there are four integral components to consider when communicating with 
vulnerable populations: identification – defining vulnerable populations and where they are 
located; media – utilizing media sources that these communities frequently use; form – the 
message content should be accessible and easily understood; and lastly, legitimacy – the 
information should come from a source that the community finds trustworthy (Renne, Sanchez & 
Litman, 2011, p.31). 
Much of the recent literature developed on the evacuation needs of vulnerable populations 
concluded that successful risk communication initiatives are characterized by local 
governments’ collaboration with the “local faith-based and secular non-profit organizations that 
work with these people on a day by day basis” (Turner et al., 2010, p.163). As discussed by 
Klaiman et al. (2010), amongst vulnerable populations, the concept of trust plays a large role in 
the effectiveness of risk communication initiatives. Similarly, the Introduction of a Guide to 
Enhance Risk Communication Among Low-Income and Minority Populations: A Grassroots 
Community Engagement Approach further emphasizes the pivotal role that trust plays among 
low-income and minority populations. For Rowel, Sheikhattari, Barber, Evans-Holland (2011) 
and Klaiman et al., (2010) trust is a frequent theme. They emphasize the need for community 
agencies and leaders to “bridge the gap” that exists between vulnerable populations and city 
governments (Rowel et al., p.124). A study conducted by The Homeland Security Institute 
supported this claim, as it assessed the role of faith-based and non-governmental organizations 
during Hurricane Katrina. The study found that these community-based organizations were able 
to provide services to vulnerable populations that the government could not (Homeland Security 
Institute, 2006). Ultimately, distrust in government, social vulnerability, and an overall lack of 
emergency preparedness education make it more challenging for government systems to 
provide disaster preparedness assistance to these communities.  
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Conducting collaborative initiatives with community-based organizations in outreach efforts to 
vulnerable populations can be beneficial. The analysis carried out by Klaiman et al. 
discussedthe case study of the “vulnerable populations outreach model” utilized by the 
Philadelphia Department of Public Health (PDPH) and Office of Emergency Management. The 
article highlighted the successful approaches of the program in addition to its shortcomings and 
implementation. The city used a “participatory collaborative approach” to include a variety of 
essential stakeholders in the preparedness phase, particularly to cater messages to the 
respective populations and distribute them (Klaiman et al. 2010, p.247). The model provides five 
components to identify and address the needs of vulnerable populations.  
First and foremost, the PDPH establishes and maintains partnerships with community-based 
organizations that represent various vulnerable populations in the city. The PDPH went as far 
developing a database of partner CBOs to maintain active relationships with them. Furthermore, 
with the assistance of these CBOs, they developed emergency messages that could be easily 
understood by a multitude of diverse vulnerable populations within Philadelphia. Once the 
messages were created, the PDPH implemented a series of trainings to “familiarize CBOs and 
service providers with emergency preparedness concepts and tools” (2010, p. 249). These 
materials were then distributed by the relevant agencies. In the final component of this model, 
the City conducted evacuations, assessed them, and then improved on the existing messages 
and trainings based on the outcomes they found to be the most effective. 
Throughout the process of implementing the Vulnerable Populations Outreach model, many 
factors became evident to the Department of Public Health. They had blatant shortcomings in 
the realm of language accessibility, as education materials were provided only in English. They 
resolved this issue by developing materials in a dozen different languages (2010, p. 250). There 
was a fundamental lack of communication between the community-based organizations and the 
city about emergency preparedness. As a response to this, the PDPH developed a quarterly 
health bulletin to maintain open communication and keep CBOs informed, and what began as a 
partnership with three organizations eventually grew to include 287 partners (2010, p. 250). 
Allowing community and organization leaders to be involved in the multiple phases of 
preparedness created a “sustainable working relationship” amongst groups that were previously 
distrustful of government (2010, p. 250). The result has been that these newly developed 
partnerships were able to reach out to “even the hardest-to-reach communities” to provide them 
with numerous resources and information about emergency preparedness (2010, p. 250). 
Evaluations over time have found community members to be satisfied with the activities and 
materials created by the PDHP in coordination with its partners. The Vulnerable Populations 
Outreach model owes much of its success to its ability to generate trust with multiple 
organizations and agencies, and to ensure the sharing of information, resources, and 
perspectives of marginalized communities who are typically left out of the conversation. 
Authors of the Introduction of a Guide to Enhance Risk Communication Among Low-Income and 
Minority Populations: A Grassroots Community Engagement Approach arrived at similar 
conclusions but utilized a different case study, model, and methodology. Similarly to the PHDP, 
this article demonstrates the implementation of a grassroots system to target vulnerable 
populations. For the purpose of the study, a grassroots system is defined as a “partnership with 
grassroots organizations such as faith-based, community-based, and business organizations 
serving low-income minority populations” (Rowel et al., 2011, p.126). Rowel et al. agree with 
Klaiman’s assessment that when vulnerable communities or their respective organizations 
become involved in the planning process, they are more likely to be informed and willing to 
adhere to the guidelines recommended during an emergency. The Grassroots Risk 
Communication Project was implemented in the summer of 2006, involved the input of low-
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income minorities, and utilized Hurricane Katrina as the basis for gauging their perceptions of 
disaster services. The conclusion of the Phase 1 focus groups found that the participants 
identified racism and classism as primary factors contributing to distrust in government, and the 
response to Hurricane Katrina only served to increase their levels of distrust in government 
(Rowel et al., 2011, p.128). 
The results of the first phase made it evident that more active involvement of community-based 
organizations and leaders in the subsequent phases of emergency preparedness, response, 
and recovery would be effective. Phase 2 was the development of “25 agreements from faith 
and community based leaders” who agreed to disseminate risk-information “before, during, and 
after a disaster” (2011, p. 130). The guidelines developed as a result of the project, similar to 
those implemented by the Philadelphia Health Department, included the notion that community-
based organizations had the capacity to foster trust amongst vulnerable populations and 
therefore provides an effective risk communication strategy for reaching out to these 
communities (2011, p.130). 
Evaluation 
A significant factor of risk communication entails the understanding that the evacuee ultimately 
decides whether or not to evacuate based on numerous variables such as personal experience 
and trust. Therefore, it is the role of risk communication strategies to successfully communicate 
the reality of a given threat and provide adequate resources for evacuating. For this reason, risk 
communication programs should be developed to strategically understand the needs of diverse 
vulnerable populations. The National Study conducted by the University of New Orleans 
recommends that emergency managers evaluate emergency plans on the basis of their ability 
to provide services to the most vulnerable and disadvantaged populations  (Renne et al., 2008, 
p.80). This recommendation calls for a deviation from traditional, mainstream risk
communication programs, as vulnerable populations tend to have limited information and other
resources, in addition to greater transportation needs and various communication barriers.
One of the recommended ways to assess these needs and understand whether they are met is 
the use of targeted surveys that request the input of “key public agencies, nongovernmental 
organizations, and faith-based institutions” (Turner et al., 2010, p.166). In theory, the surveys 
would help identify a multitude of social vulnerability characteristics, such as phone accessibility 
or English acquisition, as well as provide geographical information about vulnerable populations. 
However, there are often discrepancies between the survey information and the number of 
people who actually evacuate, as it ultimately comes down to individual personal choice. This 
emphasizes the importance of post-evacuation assessments to better understand whether 
these risk communication messages are reaching the intended vulnerable populations and 
whether they have the capacity to influence their individual decision-making (Turner et al., 2010, 
p. 166).
Qualitative research tends to distinguish mainly between those who do and do not evacuate. As 
such, there are limited studies that actually address the differences among the responses of 
various vulnerable populations to mandatory evacuation (Eisenman, Cordasco, Asch, Golden & 
Glik, 2010, p. S109). There is a need for in-depth assessments of evacuation decisions and 
their relation to existing risk communication programs, and ways to better understand social and 
cultural contexts that affect people’s decisions when evacuating. Eisenman et al., conducted 
evacuee interviews at a Houston shelter after Hurricane Katrina seeking to identify the extent of 
understanding prior to the hurricane, what resources or lack thereof influenced their evacuation 
decision, and what factors could have changed their minds (2010, p. S110). Every interview was 
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audio recorded, transcribed, and followed by content analysis to identify frequent themes in the 
interviews. The researchers then reviewed and coded the transcripts to resolve any 
discrepancies in coding through consensus agreement (2010, p. S110). Through this process, 
they identified the failures of risk communication, particularly as it related to trust and effective 
message development.  
 
Evaluation of risk communication programs poses particular challenges because of the 
extensive “non-tangible items” involved (Ng & Hamby, 1997, p. 17). In order to identify whether 
a risk communication program was successful, it is imperative to gauge the feedback from its 
intended audience (1997, p. 17). According to Ng and Hamby, the success of a risk 
communication program can be determined by its ability to adapt and improve to meet the 
needs of an ever-changing audience. By consistently reaching out to these audiences for input, 
organizations are better capable of providing risk communications that are concise, clear, and 
most importantly, relatable to the audience.  
 
Discussion  
 
One of the predominant issues with the existing literature is that it was developed by those in 
the field of emergency management. There is a notable lack of literature created by actual 
communication experts, who might provide better insight and methodology in communicating 
with vulnerable populations. The majority of the literature fails to examine the ability to reach out 
to vulnerable communities, but rather gauges the effectiveness of their risk communication 
programs on the ability to reach the general population. The few studies conducted on the ability 
of particular risk communication strategies in reaching vulnerable populations have limited 
qualitative and quantitative data. Additionally, there seems to be an overall lack of 
standardization across the literature in the definitions and methodology utilized in developing 
risk communication strategies for vulnerable populations. 
 
While there are plentiful resources on risk communication and feedback in the field of 
evaluation, there is an evident shortcoming in assessing programs that are designedto reach 
vulnerable populations. Risk communications must diverge from mainstream strategies to 
properly inform the hard-to-reach vulnerable communities. Despite this consensus among 
scholars, very little research has been conducted on evaluating established risk communication 
programs that target vulnerable populations. The limited studies on pre-established programs 
have basic explanations on outcomes with restricted information on methodology.  
 
Conclusion and Future Study 
 
Based on the literature reviewed, it is recommended that all effective risk communication 
programs include messages catered to their appropriate audiences, with effective, informative 
messages disseminated by a trusted individual. There is a growing necessity in the field of 
emergency preparedness to promote interactive risk communication that encourages citizen 
involvement, as well as the involvement of the organizations that are in the closest proximity to 
vulnerable communications. Additionally, it is important that researchers examine emerging 
initiatives that cater to vulnerable populations, in order to better understand the effectiveness of 
these strategies to provide information and assistance to the vulnerable. Overall, the literature 
suggests that localities develop risk communication programs with the understanding that 
reaching vulnerable populations requires innovative and collaborative strategies that differ 
greatly from the status quo of traditional risk communication.  
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2017 City Assisted Evacuation Full-Scale Exercise Evaluation Summary 
Introduction 
The City of New Orleans held a Full-Scale Exercise of its City Assisted Evacuation (CAE) on 
May 17, 2017 at the New Orleans Ernest N. Morial Convention Center. Participants included 
representatives from local, state and federal government agencies, various non-governmental 
entities, and volunteers who played the role of evacuees. Following the exercise, UNO-CHART 
distributed evaluations to those who participated. Of the 496 exercise participants, 25%, or 126, 
completed the survey. The evaluations included 12 questions about the respondent’s role in the 
exercise, their future use of the CAE, what they learned from the exercise, and what they 
thought could be changed or improved. The evaluation form included two multiple choice 
questions, one fill in the blank question, 5 Likert scale questions, and four open ended 
questions. The multiple choice and Likert scale responses are organized in tables on the 
following pages. The responses to the four discussion questions were hand coded and 
organized into themes. This evaluation will help the City of New Orleans assess the progress 
made in the Full-Scale Exercise, and will help identify specific areas in which the City excelled, 
as well as areas that could be improved for future real and simulated evacuations. A copy of the 
evaluation is attached to this summary.  
Evaluation Responses (Closed-ended Questions) 
# %
Volunteer	Evacuee 100 80.6%
Exercise	Staff 9 7.3%
Player 9 7.3%
Observer 6 4.8%
Other___ 0 0%
1. What	was	your	role	in	the	exercise	today?
Figure 1 - Photo Credit: New Orleans Fire Department 
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Survey respondents played several different roles in the exercise. The overwhelming majority 
were Volunteer Evacuees, followed by a small number of Exercise Staff, Players (general 
population), and Observers. Exercise staff and observers were representatives of local, state 
and federal agencies, as well as non-governmental agencies. 
 
 
 
Most evaluation respondents that evacuated represented members of the General Population, 
followed by evacuees that were Family Members, and Pet Owners. Evacuees also acted as 
People with Multiple Roles, Disabled Populations, Caregivers, Special Needs Populations, UPT 
Walkups (pedestrians), Mentally Ill Evacuees, Sex Offenders, Undocumented People, People 
Injured During the Evacuation, and People with Substance Abuse Issues.  
 
 
 
 
The majority of participants in the Full Scale Exercise did not know people who will participate in 
a real life CAE. However, a significant number, 39.1%, said they or someone they knew would 
use the CAE in the future. 
 
 
# %
31 38.3%
14 17.3%
10 12.3%
6 7.4%
5 6.2%
3 3.7%
3 3.7%
2 2.5%
2 2.5%
2 2.5%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
1 1.2%
Undocumented	People
UPT	Walkups
Sex	Offenders
2.	If	you	were	an	evacuee,	what	role	did	you	play	?	
General	Population
Family	Members
Pet	Owners
Special	Needs	Evacuees
Disabled	Populations
Caregivers
Substance	Abuse	Issues
Injured	During	Evacuation
Mentally	Ill	Populations
People	with	Multiple	Roles
# %
Yes 45 39.1%
No 70 60.9%
3.	Will	you	or	anyone	you	know	rely	on	the	
CAE	if	the	city	calls	for	an	evacuation?
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Overwhelmingly, people agreed that trial runs for future City Assisted Evacuations are 
something the city needs. Of the exercise participants, 79.3% thought that the exercise was 
useful. 
 
 
 
 
Of those surveyed, 40.8% thought that the exercise was well organized; 25% had a neutral 
response while 34.1% thought the exercise was not well organized.  
 
 
 
Residents were split on whether they thought the City is prepared to evacuate after the Full-
Scale Exercise. As many as 34.7% of the respondents believed that the City of New Orleans is 
prepared for an evacuation; 27.4% had a neutral opinion on the matter, and 37.9% did not 
agree that the City is prepared for future evacuations.  
 
 
 
The evaluations indicated that most attendants learned something new about the Evacuation 
Plan after taking part in the exercise. A total of 74.4% of people strongly agreed or agreed that 
they learned something new about the city’s plan. 
 
 
# %
13 10.5%
30 24.2%
Neither	Agree	nor	Disagree 34 27.4%
35 28.2%
12 9.7%
Disagree
Strongly	Disagree
6.	Today's	exercise	showed	that	the	City	of	New	
Orleans	is	prepared	to	evacuate	the	city.
Agree
Strongly	Agree
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Furthermore, a majority, 59.2%, agreed or strongly agreed that they were better prepared to 
evacuate in an emergency event.  A total of 21.7% of the survey participants were neutreal in 
their response while 19.2% did not agree that they were now better prepared to evacuate.  
 
Data Analysis (Open-ended Questions) 
 
The UNO-CHART team analyzed the open-ended-question data (questions 9-12) by identifying 
the common themes. The four open ended questions were as follows: 
9. What was the most important thing you learned today about the City Assisted 
Evacuation Plan?  
10. Is there something that the City of New Orleans can do to better support residents if an 
evacuation is called?  
11. What would you change about today’s exercise? 
12. Additional comments. 
 
Findings 
 
The project team analyzed the open ended question responses and identified common themes. 
These themes included positive experiences with the evacuation plan, improve communication 
and signage, improve organization and preparedness, improve access to food and water, 
impvove language acess, and special needs population/medical issues.   
 
I. Positive Experiences with the Evacuation Plan 
While there was some constructive criticism of the CAE, many people who participated in the 
evaluation had positive things to say about the exercise.  
 
I went through Katrina as a 12-year-old. I'm now 24 and it’s nice to see that the city 
has taken action for an evacuation plan. Thank you! Signed, Katrina Survivor. 
 
There are so many layers to evacuating and I think Evacuteers did a good job 
juggling this. 
 
The plan seems to accommodate so many different people and needs. 
 
Having this evacuation plan is a move in the right direction. 
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II. Improve Communication and Signage 
Residents stated that they needed better signage and communication throughout the exercise. 
This included communication from Evacuteers to volunteer evacuees, communication issues 
with the exercise staff, and general miscommunication regarding exercise logistics.  
Respondents also mentioned that there should be more communication among staff members, 
specifically NOPD and EMS, and more communication for volunteers. Often, volunteers did not 
fully understand the process; they did not understand how they should move through the 
process and/or why they were waiting in a particular area or being moved  from place to place. 
 
When I was shuttled to Sanchez Center, they could not immediately answer my 
questions about helping a person, critical with COPD, that relies 100% on oxygen. 
Didn't get real answer till I returned to Convention Center. 
 
They need more people describing what to do once they get to the UPT triage. 
Couldn’t always hear at the front and groups with pets got separated. Need more 
signage and a louder PA system. 
 
As a walkup, there was not a table set up, no one knew where it was. After I 
checked in I was told to sit back in the area I had been sitting in from the start. 
There was no direction where I was supposed to be transported to. I guess I was 
supposed to stay at the UPT. 
 
At one point I was separated from my family to register my pet. The airplane staff 
wouldn't let them go with me on the bus. The pet people said they could and there 
was a lot of miscommunication. 
 
 
III. Improve Organization and Preparedness 
Participants also stated that they believed the City needs to practice more, improve its 
organization, and better prepare for future real and simulated CAEs. Respondents expressed 
concerns related to the registration of  people with multiple special needs. There was also 
confusion about the roles of the CAE participants. Observations were notes regarding the 
difference between staff and observer roles, confusion about whether DFCS or NOPD should 
take in sex offenders, and confusion around roles between EMS and Nurse Triage. Those 
surveyed also suggested that staff should practice responding to inquiries at the JIC and add 
mental health and first aid training to the exercise.  Respondents also noted the need for staff 
members to receive sensitivity training and for staff to be be respectful of the volunteers. Finally, 
participants stated that buses should be in good working order prior to evacuation and that real 
and simulated CAEs should be more timely.  
 
A lot more details need to be worked out. Once a blue vest person asked me for 
directions on what to do! 
 
The city doesn’t have one [a plan] based on what I experienced as a walkup.  
 
Don't take any pet, because it takes time to register. 
 
If the Hurricane comes tomorrow – no one is ready. 
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IV. Improve Access to Food and Water 
Respondents stated repeatedly that they they were not satisfiedissues with the lunch that was 
provided and that many wanted, but did not receive snacks and water during the Exercise. 
Others were confused by the lack of communication regarding snacks, water, coffee, and lunch.  
 
Food and water availability and communication was lacking. 
 
Very disappointed in the lack of a decent meal. Whoever organized the food 
should never do it again! 
 
We did two exercises, the 9th ward and airport, didn't arrive back till after 2. we 
were not given a snack or drink the entire day. When arriving back, there was 
minimal food left and food was weak and bland. 
 
Multiple people I was with can't eat meat gumbo (not vegetarian, not gluten free, 
bad for shellfish allergies, not kosher or halal). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
V. Improve Language Access 
Populations from Spanish and Vietnamese communities, as well as those who use sign 
language, stated that they were not given enough support, and that some volunteers could not 
communicate with staff during the registration process. 
 
I still have questions about our capacity to communicate with Spanish + 
Vietnamese speaking people – at all levels. 
 
Provide sign language, foreign language support. 
 
Translators should be at every transition/intake spot. 
 
VI. Special Needs Populations/Medical  Issues 
Evacuation participants stated the need for more planning for special needs populations during 
future CAEs. Respondents indicated that those with special needs were separated from their 
Figure 2 - Photo Credit: New Orleans Fire Department 
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families and that Evacuspot volunteers were not prepared to deal with certain health issues. 
Survey respondents recommended that those with health issues should be ready before the city 
calls a mandatory evacuation, and that those with critical needs should not have to wait with the 
general population at UPT. Participants also noted that that a person’s medical condition should 
not be made public during the CAE process. 
 
I was separated from my family at the medical center and was then on my own 
because there was only one caretaker allowed--that seems inappropriate. 
 
Patients with critical health needs should not have to go through this long 
process to get them to a medical shelter. Should not be mixed with the general 
population. My loved one who I will travel with as caregiver has a severe medical 
condition and is oxygen dependent 100%. 
 
Don't forget about special needs people, put them first!!!! I was a special needs 
volunteer and I was forgotten – I would hate that to happen to anyone who 
actually had special needs. I should have had a care giver. This is particularly 
important if the care receiver is non-communicative. 
 
One of the 1st responders yelled out "who has schizophrenia?" If that had been 
the real world that would have made that person very uncomfortable. Do not 
identify or try to identify evacuees by a diagnosis either during a drill or in reality, 
this is HIPAA protected info. During registration a red tag should be given to 
someone with mental health issues and the 1st responders will see on site. 
 
Conclusion 
Overall, the results of the evaluation highlight the importance and effectiveness of the CAE 
exercise. Survey participants provided both positive and negative feedback upon which the city 
may build for future CAE exercises as well as for actual implementation. Analysis of the survey 
responses reveal a need for improvement in the following areas: communication and signage; 
exercise preparation, organization and practice; access to food and water; language access, 
and the needs of special needs populations, including those with medical issues.  
  
Appendix:	City	Assisted	Evacuation	Full	Scale	Exercise	Volunteer	Evaluation	
	
City Assisted Evacuation Full Scale Exercise  
Volunteer Evaluation 
Wednesday, May 17, 2017 
 
Thank you for your participation in today’s exercise. Please take a moment to answer the 
following questions to help us improve the City Assisted Evacuation Plan.  
 
1. What was your role in the exercise today? (circle one) 
Exercise Staff Player  Volunteer Evacuee  Observer 
 Other_________ 
 
2. If you were an evacuee, what role did you play? _____________________   
 
3. Will you or anyone you know rely on the City Assisted Evacuation if the city calls for an 
evacuation? (circle one) 
Yes  No 
  
  
Strongly 
Agree Agree 
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree 
Disagree Strongly Agree 
4. Today’s exercise was useful.       
5. Today’s exercise was well 
organized.       
6. Today’s exercise showed that the 
City of New Orleans is prepared to 
evacuate the city. 
     
7. I learned something new about 
the City’s Evacuation Plan from this 
exercise.  
     
8. I am now better prepared to 
evacuate if the City calls for an 
evacuation. 
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9. What was the most important thing you learned today about the City Assisted Evacuation 
Plan? 
             
              
 
 
10. Is there something that the City of New Orleans can do to better support residents if an 
evacuation is called? 
             
              
 
11. What would you change about today’s exercise? 
             
              
 
 
12. Additional comments: 
             
              
             
              
 
 
13. If you would like to continue to volunteer with the City Assisted Evacuation process, please 
share your contact information below. 
 
Name:       Organization:      
Email:       Phone:       
 
 
 
 
 
 
